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MICHAEL C. BLUMM* & JAMES BRUNBERG**

“Not Much Less Necessary…Than the
Atmosphere They Breathed”: Salmon,
Indian Treaties, and the Supreme
Court—A Centennial Remembrance
of United States v. Winans and Its
Enduring Significance
ABSTRACT
A century ago, the Supreme Court decided United States v.
Winans, which upheld the Indian treaty right to cross private
property to access traditional fishing grounds in the Columbia
River. The Winans decision protected critically important
cultural and economic practices from white encroachment. The
landmark case came as a surprise in an era committed to Indian
assimilation and allotment. This article examines the case, its
context, its participants, and its contributions to Indian natural
resources law.
The dispute took place at Celilo Falls, the most important
Indian fishing site in the Columbia Basin, although the
government agents and attorneys viewed it as a test case
emblematic of the clash of cultures taking place throughout the
Northwest at the end of the nineteenth century. In fact, the article
considers in some depth two predecessor cases involving the same
tract of land at issue in Winans and suggests that the Indian
agents who pursued the case did so because they saw treaty
fishing as an economic lifeline for Indians who had failed at
agrarianism on-reservation.
The district court issued a confusing array of injunctions and
opinions that ultimately culminated in dismissal of the case some
eight years after it was filed. A direct appeal to the Supreme
Court produced an opinion memorable almost as much for its
poetic language as for its result. Justice Joseph McKenna, not
otherwise known for his lyricism, wrote that fishing at Celilo
Falls was “not much less necessary to the Indians than the
atmosphere they breathed” and proceeded to rule that their treaty
*
**
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rights included the imposition of a “servitude, a right in land”
over lands necessary to access their traditional fishing sites. In
response to the lower court’s conclusion that the treaty language
recognizing a tribal “right of taking fish in common with
settlers” meant only equality of treatment, McKenna averred that
such a result was “certainly an impotent outcome to negotiations
and a convention, which seemed to promise more and give the
word of the Nation for more.”
The decision’s lodestar status is not merely due to its language,
however. It established the reserved rights doctrine, which holds
that Indian treaties are “not a grant of rights to the Indians but a
grant of rights from them—a reservation of rights not granted.”
Over the last century, the reserved rights doctrine has been
immensely important in recognizing tribal proprietary rights to
natural resources and in protecting tribal sovereignty. Winans
also reaffirmed the rule that Indian treaties should be interpreted
as the Indians, the weaker party, would have understood and
rejected claims that state ownership of the riverbed foreclosed
federally created treaty rights. Both of these principles endure.
Finally, the case recognized treaty fishing rights as property
rights that would run against not only the federal government
but also burden the state and private parties, a precedent that
some recent lower court decisions seem to have overlooked.
The year 2005 marked a double centennial: 200 years since
Meriwether Lewis and William Clark collided with Northwest Indian
cultures while navigating the Columbia River1 and 100 years since the
Supreme Court decided the landmark case United States v. Winans.2 The
Court in Winans announced that mid-nineteenth century treaties, in
which Northwest Indian tribes ceded most of their lands to the federal
government in exchange for relatively small land reservations, also
recognized important tribal off-reservation property rights.3 Thus,
landowners could not exclude tribal fishers from their historic salmon
fishing sites at Celilo Falls, the center of the Columbia River salmon
fishery. The epic Winans decision still seems surprising, since it was the
product of an era in which assimilation of Indian tribes was the
dominant federal policy;4 in 1905, the federal government was breaking
1.

See generally 5–7 MERIWETHER LEWIS & WILLIAM CLARK, THE DEFINITIVE JOURNALS
(Gary E. Moulton ed., 1988).
2. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905). The year 2005 also marked 150 years
since the signing of the treaty the Supreme Court interpreted in Winans. See infra Part III.
3. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 37.01(b)(1), 37.02(a)(2) (Robert E. Beck ed.,
LEXIS 2004 repl. vol. ed.).
4. See, e.g., DELOS S. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 141
(Francis Paul Prucha ed., 1973); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 1.04 (Nell
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up Indian reservations in order to encourage the assimilation of tribal
members into the American melting pot, thereby combating
communistic reservation land holdings while simultaneously promoting
Christianity.5
Winans, however, proclaimed that the tribes’ treaty fishing rights
were enduring, not temporary. Justice Joseph McKenna’s opinion also
declared that the treaty rights burdened not only the federal government
that negotiated the treaties, but states and private landowners as well.6
This far-sighted decision, which still reverberates today,7 needs to be
understood in the context of the history of the region, its peoples, and
their fishing practices.
Winans laid down landmark principles of treaty interpretation
that today influence courts in diverse fields, including disputes over
ownership of submerged lands, tribal membership, criminal jurisdiction,
mineral rights, and water rights.8 The language of the decision is almost
Jessup Newton ed., 2005); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW:
NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 16 (1987); FRANCIS PAUL
PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN
INDIANS 659 (1984); Indian General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 5, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
5. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 (1995).
6. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381–82. Winans was an 8-1 decision, with Justice Edward White
dissenting without opinion. On Justice McKenna, see infra note 267.
7. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 224
(1999) (citing Winans for its use of the canons of treaty construction and for federal
jurisdiction over Indian affairs); Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 671, 681 (1979) (citing Winans for its treaty interpretation); United States
v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 639 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Justice McKenna’s poetic
“atmosphere” simile); Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Wash.,
573 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1978) (reiterating that Indians have a special status with regard to
fishing rights and state regulation); Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 113 (W.D.N.Y. 1995)
(citing the Winans concept that tribes “retain all rights not specifically withdrawn by
treaty” in deciding that the state lacked jurisdiction to decide a tribal affair); Grand
Traverse Band of Ottowa & Chippewa Indians v. Dir., Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 141 F.3d
635, 639 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Winans for the existence of an access easement across all
shorefront land, even if privately owned, as well as for the liberal, pro-tribe treaty
construction); Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 461 (7th Cir.
1998) (denying off-reservation aboriginal fishing rights for tribe, distinguishing Winans
rights—which were explicit in the treaty—from the Menominee Tribe’s, which were not).
Recently, the federal judge in New Mexico’s Jemez River water rights adjudication
employed Winans to uphold governmentally recognized aboriginal water rights that were
designed to preserve treaty-time uses. United States v. Abousleman, Civ. No 83cv01041
MV-ACE, at 26 (D.N.M. Oct. 4, 2004) (referring to these water rights as “Winans rights”
and citing 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 37.02(a)(2).
8. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 7; Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262, 274 (2001)
(ownership of submerged lands); United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (tribal
membership in eagle feather case); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978)
(criminal tribal jurisdiction); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 642 (1970)
(mineral rights); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908) (water rights).
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poetic, reflective of the best a dominant society can provide to those it
has invaded:
The right to resort to the fishing places in controversy was
part of larger rights possessed by the Indians, upon the
exercise of which there was not a shadow of impediment,
and which were not much less necessary to the existence of
the Indians than the atmosphere they breathed….In other
words, the treaty was not a grant of rights to the Indians
but a grant of rights from them—a reservation of those not
granted.9
Such rhetoric does not often find its way into Supreme Court opinions,
especially from the 1905 Court.10 Explaining how and why this came to
pass is the task of this centennial remembrance.
This article examines both the events that led to the Winans
decision and its continuing significance today. Section I supplies deep
background on the participants and the locus of the conflict that led to
the Winans case, beginning with pre-human geologic events and
continuing with the development of aboriginal dependence on salmon
and other subsistence fishing practices. Section II then proceeds to
explain the Lewis and Clark expedition and the effects of the ensuing
wave of white settlement a generation or two later. Section III analyzes
the mid-nineteenth century treaties that recognized the tribes’ rights to
fish and explores the aftermath of these rights. Section IV tracks the
rapid erosion of treaty promises in the face of late nineteenth century
pressure from homesteading and an emergent non-Indian salmon fishing
industry, culminating in the first court case involving the treaty fishing
right—Spedis v. Simpson—a case involving the same Celilo Falls fishing
site at issue in Winans, as well as many of the latter case’s participants.11
Section V discusses in some detail another predecessor case of the
Winans decision, United States v. Taylor,12 a dispute that anticipated many
of the issues that the Winans decision would ultimately resolve.
Section VI, the heart of the article, evaluates Winans both
doctrinally and in terms of its effects on tribal fishing in the Northwest.
9. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381–82.
10. Just one month earlier, the Court handed down its controversial decision in Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a 5-4 decision marked by both its divided, fragmented
opinion and its laissez-faire economics, striking down labor-friendly legislation and
ushering in what became known as the “Lochner Era,” in which a thin but activist majority
of the Court frequently protected private property and promoted state rights at the expense
of socio-economic regulation.
11. Spedis v. Simpson (Klickitat County Ct. July 22, 1884) (on file in Klickitat County,
Wash. Archive, File KLK-126).
12. 13 P. 333 (Wash. Terr. 1887).
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Section VII explains the enduring effect of Winans, in terms of the
progeny it spawned, on the Northwest today. The article concludes that
the Winans doctrine remains an under-appreciated source of tribal rights
today. We predict that courts in the twenty-first century will increasingly
rely on its bedrock principles to interpret the nineteenth century treaties
that gave Northwest tribes the “right of taking fish at all usual and
accustomed fishing places, in common with the citizens of the Territory,
and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them….”13
I. TIMES IMMEMORIAL: THE BIRTH OF A MIGHTY RIVER,
FISH, AND CULTURE
A. Volcanoes, Fish, and Floods
Cataclysmic geologic and evolutionary events shaped the stage
of the Winans dispute. Enormous Miocene lava flows and colossal floods
during the ice ages repeatedly threw the Columbia River from its bed,
leaving spectacular hexagonal spires of columnar basalt to line the steep
banks of the river gorge.14 In the meantime, ocean salmon first entered
the sweet waters of the river, taking an astonishing evolutionary step:
they developed the ability to use enzymes to tolerate salinity variation,
enabling them to use fresh water rivers as incubators, nurseries, refuges
from predation and extreme temperatures, and sources of new food.15
These fish evolved a metamorphic ability to change their physical shape
drastically as they made the transition between salt and fresh water
environments, acquiring massive muscles in order to navigate against
the rivers’ force. This migration of protein from the oceans to the
mainland provided food for land carnivores and supported a continental
food chain that eventually included humans.16
One particularly resilient basalt formation withstood nature’s
carving forces, creating what was called “Wyam,” “the Great Falls,” or
13.
14.

Treaty with the Yakima, June 9, 1855, 12 Stat. 951, 953 (1855) (ratified Mar. 8, 1859).
JIM LICHATOWICH, SALMON WITHOUT RIVERS: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC SALMON
CRISIS 14–20 (1999). During the Missoula floods, walls of water pushed westward at
breakneck speed as lakes half the size of the present Lake Michigan suddenly broke
through their natural dams and let loose their destruction across tens of thousands of
square miles. Id. at 17–18.
15. DAVID R. MONTGOMERY, KING OF FISH: THE THOUSAND-YEAR RUN OF SALMON 28–
30 (2003).
16. MICHAEL C. BLUMM, SACRIFICING THE SALMON: A LEGAL AND POLICY HISTORY OF
THE DECLINE OF COLUMBIA BASIN SALMON 31 (2002); Aldo Palmisano, Why Do Some Fish
Normally Live in Freshwater and Others in Saltwater? How Can Some Fish Adapt to Both?, SCI.
AMERICAN.COM, answer posted Jan. 19, 1998, http://www.sciam.com/askexpert_
question.cfm?articleID=000B9991-6E9C-1C72-9EB7809EC588F2D7&catID=3 (last visited
May 30, 2006).
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simply “Celilo.” There, a series of rapids presented formidable obstacles
to the salmon’s upstream run. Salmon and other fish crowded into an
area just downstream of the falls, where they rested before fighting to
ascend the rapids and surmount the falls. Around this concentration of
fish, a culture, and later an industry, was born.
B. The Birth of the Ancient Right of Taking Salmon
At least 9,000 years ago, the earliest fishermen harvested fish
from the Celilo Falls region, leaving evidence in the form of fish
vertebrae and crude hook-spears as well as oral histories and
mythologies.17 Bands of Cayuse, Nez Perce, Yakama, Klickitat, Paluse,
and upper-Chinookian Wasco-Wishram formed a network of fishing and
trade that connected the Pacific Coast tribes to peoples several hundred
miles inland, in the upper Columbia Basin (now Idaho, Washington, and
Montana) and the Great Plains.18 These fishermen set up both semipermanent and permanent camps near Celilo Falls. Although each band
of fishermen had a traditional spot of generally inheritable private
property, many of the best locations at the falls and along the rapids
below were shared by the tribes as common property.19
Salmon were plentiful during the annual spring, summer, and
fall runs. Despite some seasonal unavailability, about a third of
aboriginal protein intake came from salmon.20 Natives felt a spiritual
kinship, as well as a stewardship duty, to the animate earth. Because the
Indians’ spiritual and physical relationship with salmon and water was
an essential part of their culture, they acted to protect the bountiful but
fragile salmon harvest.21 Native mores prohibited dumping of trash,
waste, discarded fish parts, or even water baled from canoes into the
river, since the disrespectful act of dumping into the river might keep the
17. EUGENE S. HUNN & JAMES SELAM, NCH’I-WANA “THE BIG RIVER”: MID-COLUMBIA
INDIANS AND THEIR LAND 6, 20 (1990). Some of these fishers were likely kin, or at least
regional neighbors, of the controversial “Kennewick Man,” a traveler who fished the
Columbia River a few days’ hike upstream. Bonnichsen v. United States, 357 F.3d 962, 966
(9th Cir. 2004) (holding that the “Kennewick Man” was not a “Native American” under the
Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act so his remains were available for
scientific study).
18. See BLUMM, supra note 16, at 57; JOSEPH E. TAYLOR III, MAKING SALMON: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST FISHERIES CRISIS 24–25 (1999).
19. See FAY G. COHEN, TREATIES ON TRIAL: THE CONTINUING CONTROVERSY OVER
NORTHWEST INDIAN FISHING RIGHTS 21 (1986).
20. HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 148 (estimates range up to 80 percent for some
tribes).
21. See BLUMM, supra note 16, at 3 (“These ‘laws’ were enforced by peer pressure and
religious taboo, which usually were strong enough to ensure that they were respected”;
natives’ relationships to fish and the river were essential cultural and spiritual norms.).
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salmon from returning.22 In the myths and legends of the Celilo-based
tribes, the salmon were not merely a food supply; the tribes were
“salmon-people,” and their salmon were a collective spirit and a
nourishing vital force.23
In the spring, the population in the vicinity of Celilo Falls
blossomed from a small handful of bands to thousands of families and
fishing units and became the hub of an extensive multicultural trade
network.24 Groups of fishers exchanged dried salmon for many vital
items: roots and hides from what is now Montana and Idaho; shell beads
from Puget Sound; buffalo products and horses from the Great Plains;
obsidian, basketry, and slaves from Northern California.25
Annual ceremonies to celebrate the first caught salmon centered
on ritualizing the return of the “salmon people” (a term used to describe
both the salmon and the fishermen) in a sharing feast.26 Tribal leaders
divided the salmon into small morsels and distributed it among the
fishing community. Some tribes bore torches in a rhythmic musical
procession to the river, where the carefully preserved skeleton was
deposited at the river’s deepest point, head pointed upstream, to show
the other “salmon people” the way.27 Judge George Boldt determined
that the first salmon ceremony was “a religious rite to ensure
that…salmon were never wantonly wasted and that water pollution was
not permitted….”28
The annual arrival of salmon was a much-anticipated gift for the
people who traveled to the Columbia Gorge.29 The overall economy of
the Mid-Columbia consisted largely of “competitive gifting,”30 in which
chiefs established their social status as peaceful leaders and built
valuable trade relationships by presenting meaningful gifts. These gifts
engendered a reciprocal obligation in the recipients. Gifts were meant to
be shared, not factored into the wealth of any individual.31 The most

22.
23.

COHEN, supra note 19, at 24.
See generally DONALD M. HINES, CELILO TALES: WASCO MYTHS, LEGENDS, TALES OF
MAGIC AND THE MARVELOUS (1996).
24. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 24–27. See also 5 LEWIS & CLARK, supra note 1 (describing
in detail the practices of tribes who gathered or lived near Celilo Falls).
25. Id. at 24–25 (trade network); HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 225 (slave trading).
26. COHEN, supra note 19, at 24.
27. Id. (discussing the testimony of Frank Wright, a Puyallup Indian, before a
congressional subcommittee); HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 153.
28. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 351 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
29. See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 24–25.
30. See Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 351.
31. For more on the gift economy, see LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 44–47; TAYLOR,
supra note 18, at 37–38; Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 351 (the “Boldt Decision”).
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important “gift” was salmon, a gift from nature, which could not be
“owned” by any group or person.
Although some tribal units or bands staked out prime fishing
areas, the social more of sharing, rather than that of exclusion,
dominated the culture.32 This native view strengthened the Indians’
stewardship over the salmon and its habitat; while ownership was
largely communal, tribal leaders, whose concerns included future
generations, controlled both access and usufructuary rights.33 Eventually,
new concerns and methods would be predominate at the fisheries,
including European notions of natural resources as commodities and
fishing in pursuit of corporate profit. Thanks in part to the wisdom of the
Court in Winans, which recognized an enforceable right to continue
historic fishing practices, some remnants of the old native ways remain
in the twenty-first century.34
II. THE ARRIVAL OF WHITES ON THE COLUMBIA PLATEAU
European explorers Manuel Quiniper and George Vancouver
traded with tribes for salmon along the Pacific Coast as early as 1790,35
but Lewis and Clark were the first whites to reach the Celilo Falls area,
documenting pools abounding with otter and banks lined with Indian
fishing operations.36 Over the next half-century, whites would radically
transform the culture of the Columbia by taking its natural resources,
attempting to Christianize its peoples, and laying claim to prime land

32. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 36–37.
33. Id.; BLUMM, supra note 16, at 54.
34. Indians harvested salmon using an ingenious array of methods. As the waters
thundered around them, fishermen with long, graceful dipnets stood on rocks beside the
falls or tied themselves to logs wedged into crevices, waiting for the fish to leap against the
torrent in a rush of instinctive athleticism. In calmer waters, fishermen used long spears
and catch-hooks, or gillnets. Some used poisonous “caluks,” or lomatium, to stun the
resting fish, which then floated to the surface. Once caught, salmon were cooked over an
open fire and smoked and dried or processed into pemmican, a preserved food made of
pulverized, air-dried salmon packed into large bricks. These bricks stayed fresh for months,
weighed around 90 pounds, could be moved hundreds of miles in special baskets, and
were central to trade. When the salmon runs ended in the late fall, most of the fishing tribes
traveled up the valleys that led into the rocky gorge, set up new camps, gathered tubers
and huckleberries, and hunted game. In lean times, the pemmican provided protein until
the next fishing cycle in the spring. A family unit processed an estimated 3,000 pounds of
pemmican each year to sustain themselves, plus another 1,000 pounds for trade. Tribes
buried the pemmican in straw-lined holes beneath 12 to 15 inches of soil. Native fishing
methods are described in detail in HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 117–32.
35. BLUMM, supra note 16, at 54.
36. 5 LEWIS & CLARK, supra note 1, at 328–29 (observation by William Clark, Oct. 24,
1805).
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and fishing sites under the Oregon Donation Act of 1850.37 By 1855,
tensions were at an all-time high in the region. As land and resource
disputes increased, violence broke out.38 Treaties became an imperative
to avoid bloodshed.
A. The Effect of White Colonization on Tribal Fishing
Even before whites arrived on the Columbia Plateau, they
influenced salmon populations. Around 1730, natives began trading
“wild” horses that had escaped from white military camps in the
hundreds of miles distant. These horses helped to accelerate the tribal
salmon-trade network, allowing fishermen to transport large amounts of
goods and technological innovations over great distances, commercially
interconnecting peoples who previously had only periodic, limited
interactions.39 The increased contact also facilitated a migration of new
European viruses and bacteria from village to village, fueling outbreaks
of pestilence that tragically reduced the native population to roughly
one-tenth of its pre-contact size.40
When Lewis and Clark reached the Mid-Columbia Plateau in
1805, salmon and the people who depended on it were everywhere. The
explorers observed salmon teeming in the clear waters of the Columbia.
William Clark even suggested that the Indians used the surplus for
fuel.41 The fall 1805 passage of Lewis and Clark was an inventory
expedition, searching for a trans-continental passage and gathering
information about natives and the natural resources that would fuel
western expansion. The explorers were greeted by awestruck natives,
some of whom revered the explorers as superhuman gift-bearers
descended from the clouds.42 Both parties maintained friendly
commercial transactions and seemed optimistic about future relations.43
Fur traders were the first European group to directly affect the
salmon populations. The British-owned Hudson Bay Company wanted
to leave nothing useful or marketable behind for the rapidly expanding
United States, so in the early 1840s, its policy was to eradicate every last
beaver in the Oregon Territory.44 Since beaver dams regulated
streamflow and provided breeding and rearing areas, they had been

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Oregon Donation Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 496.
See HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 32.
Id. at 22–27.
BLUMM, supra note 16, at 56; TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 39–40.
5 LEWIS & CLARK, supra note 1, at 286 (observation by William Clark, Oct. 16, 1805).
Id. at 305 (observations by Lewis & Clark).
Id. at 278.
LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 55–56.
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instrumental in keeping the salmon population strong through natural
selection.45 With the decimation of the beaver, salmon runs suffered their
first decline due to Euro-American concepts of resource consumption.
B. Mounting Tensions on the Columbia Plateau
Missionaries descended on the mid-Columbia region in the late
1830s and 1840s.46 From these Christian, agrarian disease incubators,
Indians learned agrarian and Christian practices and, eventually, distrust
of the white man.47 Disease that lay incubating in the missions’ close
confines dealt an annihilative blow to the Indians that culminated in
violence. Dr. Marcus Whitman, the missionary at The Dalles, failed to
fend off measles and other diseases, which claimed the lives of half the
Cayuse tribe.48 The Cayuse made the apparently rational connection
between the superior spiritual power claimed by the missionaries and
the ensuing wave of pestilence. Tribal people therefore concluded that
Whitman had acquired the “murderous” nature of one who had gained
too much spiritual power, yet failed as a healer, a punishable offense in
Cayuse culture.49
As a result of Whitman’s failure to prevent measles and other
diseases, and in an effort to prevent the apparent annihilation of the
tribe, Cayuse men murdered Whitman and his family members and also
took hostages in 1847.50 The bloodshed at the Whitman Mission sparked
widespread panic throughout white settlements. The Oregon legislature
quickly commissioned a small army to bring the Cayuse to justice, while
a “peace commission,” led by Joel Palmer, negotiated the surrender of
five Cayuse suspects (all of whom were hung) and their white
hostages.51

45. Id.
46. Methodists and Catholics established missions in The Dalles in 1838 and 1848.
Nat’l Park Serv., U.S. Dept. of Interior, Whitman Mission NHS—History & Culture,
http://www.nps.gov/whmi/history/timeline4.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006); St. Peter’s,
The Dalles, Heritage Trail Press, http://www.heritagetrailpress.com/CHURCH_
RECORDS/Parish_St_Peter_The_Dalles_OR.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2006).
47. See HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 39–40.
48. For background on the events surrounding the Whitman murders, see generally
RONALD LANSING, JUGGERNAUT: THE WHITMAN MASSACRE TRIAL, 1850 (1993).
49. HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 40.
50. Id.
51. Among other alleged abuses of justice surrounding the controversial Whitman
“Massacre” trial, James Doty, later a leader of Stevens’ treaty negotiating team, reported
that “a white man in the employ of Dr. Whitman” had incited the Cayuse, and thus was
responsible for the murder because he “carried false reports to the Indians camp.” JAMES
DOTY, JOURNAL OF OPERATIONS OF GOVERNOR ISAAC INGALLS STEVENS OF WASHINGTON
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C. Pressure from the East, Panic and Fear in the West, Indians in the
Middle
The Treaty of 1846 established the border between British
Canada and the United States.52 Two years later, Congress enacted the
Organic Act of 184853 to govern the Oregon Territory, which, reflecting
the federal role of protecting the tribes, expressly promised that the
creation of the territory would not “impair the rights of persons or
property now pertaining to the Indians.”54
Despite the fact that Indian title55 had not been extinguished,
Congress quickly undercut its promise to protect Indian lands by
authorizing homesteading in the Oregon Donation Act of 1850.56 The
Donation Act opened the vast Oregon Territory to settlement, offering
320-acre parcels to individual settlers and twice that to married couples57
while ignoring Indian possession.58 Indian title did not prevent the
federal government from conveying “title” to a settler because Indian
title was thought to be merely usufructuary.59 But actually, the federal
government possessed only what amounted to a preemptive right to
purchase the fee from the Indian possessors,60 and the tribes had not yet
sold or ceded their lands. Although homesteaded land was “subject only
to the Indian title of occupancy,”61 the existence of this significant
encumbrance was not mentioned in the language of the homestead
patents. Donation Act grants therefore amounted to premature promises

TERRITORY IN 1855, at 49 (1978). For a detailed account of this trial and circumstances
surrounding it, see LANSING, supra note 48.
52. Treaty with Great Britain, in Regard to Limits Westward of the Rocky Mountains,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., June 15, 1846, 9 Stat. 869.
53. An Act to Establish the Territorial Government of Oregon, 9 Stat 323 (1848)
(Oregon Organic Statute).
54. Id. For the original language, see the Northwest Ordinance, reprinted in 32 J.
CONTINENTAL CONG. 334 (1934).
55. See Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal
Sovereignty, and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in
Indian Country, 28 VT. L. REV. 713, 728, 739 (2004) (explaining Indian title and its
extinguishment).
56. Oregon Donation Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 496.
57. See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 44.
58. Id.
59. In Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 142–43 (1810), Chief Justice Marshall described Indian
land rights as usufructuary, an unfortunate mislabeling of property rights that, 145 years
later, contributed to a decision that sanctioned government taking of Indian title land
without compensation. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955);
Blumm, supra note 55, at 730.
60. See Blumm, supra note 55, at 738–39.
61. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 592 (1823).
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that created considerable pressure for treaties that would give settlers
clear title by extinguishing Indian title.
III. THE TREATIES: THE ROLE OF FISHING RIGHTS IN
FULFILLING A PEACEFUL MANIFEST DESTINY
The world views of white settlers and natives collided as
homesteaders poured into the Northwest. The federal government
attempted to meld the two cultures together—or at least avoid war—
through treaty making. Treaties became the vehicles by which the
government terminated Indian title establishing Indian land reservations
and by which the tribes reserved their ancient fishing, hunting, and
gathering rights. Although much of the native population had been
decimated by disease, the treaties enabled the whites to push aside the
surviving tribal members while making at least a facial attempt to
civilize them into agrarians. The attempted agrarian conversion largely
failed, but the treaties’ recognition of the Indians’ fishing rights endures.
A. The Need for Treaties
Peaceful white settlement of the vast new, resource-rich Oregon
Territory required systematic termination of Indian title. Through a
fevered-pitch campaign, the federal government signed treaties during a
seven-month period of 1854 and 1855 that terminated aboriginal title to
most of the coveted lands, required tribes to relocate to newly
established reservations, and recognized the tribes’ “right of taking fish
at all usual and accustomed places.”62
Federal recognition of tribal fishing was an indispensable treaty
promise without which some of the treaties certainly would not have
been signed. The tribes clearly bargained for the inclusion of these
ancient rights.63 The federal goals of extinguishing Indian title and
assimilating the tribes into an agrarian economy contrasted with the
tribes’ desire to preserve their fishing, hunting, and gathering practices.
The treaties accommodated both wishes. On one hand, they attempted to
convert Indians into a new way of life that whites believed would
complement the influx of agrarian, Christian ways. Thus, the federal
government promised federal protection from white expansion or
occupation,64 along with some institutional and infrastructural support
in the form of funds for schools, hospitals, and gunsmith, tinsmith, and

62.
63.
64.

See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakima, supra note 13, at 952–53.
See BLUMM, supra note 16, at 60–62.
See, e.g., Treaty with the Yakima, supra note 13, art. II.

Spring 2006]

SALMON & INDIAN TREATIES

13

blacksmith operations.65 On the other hand, the treaties’ recognition of
off-reservation fishing, hunting, and gathering rights66 became a legal
foothold to maintain ancient subsistence ways in a new era. Despite the
clash between ancient and new ways, the treaties gave recognition to
both.
B. The Treaty Architects and Their Task
The first white men to record what would become known as
Winans fishing rights in written form were Joel Palmer, an Oregon
settler-turned-diplomat, and Isaac Ingalls Stevens, a West Point
graduate, an officer in the Army Corps of Engineers, and Washington’s
first territorial governor.67 These two were the architects of sweeping
change in the Northwest. The ambitious Stevens68 formed militias,
ignoring the cautionary advice of the Military Department of the Pacific
(in San Francisco), which warned him to await troops and supplies
before proceeding to subdue “hostile Indians.”69 Stevens once said of a
Cayuse conflict that “the war shall be prosecuted until the last hostile
Indian is exterminated.”70 He aimed to quell the fears of white settlers
who remembered the “Whitman Massacre”71 and other scattered
hostilities. Palmer was a respected settler, peace commissioner, and
superintendent of Indian Affairs. He and Stevens convinced the Indians
that, for their own protection, they should cede their lands to whites,
move to reservations, and attempt to become farmers.
Stevens and Palmer placed themselves in the dual roles of being
both the mouthpieces and the negotiating agents for the United States in
its rush to push westward into disputed lands. They aimed, in the words
65. See, e.g., id. art. V.
66. See, e.g., id. art. III.
67. The Senate failed to ratify earlier treaties negotiated by Superintendent of Indian
Affairs Dr. Anson Dart in the Willamette Valley because they called for reservations close
to white settlements rather than relocating the tribes far from white populations, as in the
case of the Southern tribes who had been relocated to Oklahoma the previous decade. See
KENT D. RICHARDS & ISAAC I. STEVENS, YOUNG MAN IN A HURRY 195 (1993). Many Indians
also opposed the Dart treaties because they would force diverse tribes to share reservations
on new terrain where they feared disease, and because whites immediately moved onto the
land without awaiting treaty ratification. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., UNCOMMON
CONTROVERSY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE TREATY-PROTECTED FISHING RIGHTS OF THE TRIBES OF
THE NORTHWEST COAST 15–16 (1975). See also BLUMM, supra note 16, at 56–57.
68. Not only was Stevens appointed by President Pierce as governor of the
Washington territory, a job that included the title of Indian Superintendent, he was also
surveyor for a northern railroad route to the Pacific with the Department of War.
RICHARDS, supra note 67, at 99.
69. DOTY, supra note 51, at 5 (Edward J. Kowrach’s introduction).
70. Id. at 6.
71. See generally LANSING, supra note 49.
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of Judge George Boldt, to “forestall[] friction between Indians and
settlers and between settlers and the government.”72 Military officers
stationed in the Oregon territory warned that a violent Indian backlash
was imminent if settlers continued to infringe on native lands.73 ExSuperintendent of Indian Affairs Dr. Anson Dart74 warned that the
Oregon Land Donation Act gave away land already “owned and
occupied by a people that the Government has always acknowledged to
be the bonafide [sic] and rightful owners of the soil.”75 “A serious
difficulty…is unavoidable,” Dart continued.76 With high stakes and
looming potential conflict, Stevens (in the Washington Territory) and
Palmer (in the Oregon Territory) set to work on procuring a peaceful,
massive property rights transfer.
C. The Treaty Negotiations
Despite Dart’s justifiable pessimism and a caldron of conflicting
interests among diverse Indian tribes and land-hungry white settlers,
Palmer and Stevens successfully set the stage for the orchestration of a
rapid, massive, peaceful land acquisition. They won the trust, or in some
respects, the submission, of wary, disease-wracked native communities.77
In treaty council meetings, where the previously drafted
agreements were signed by both tribal members and federal negotiators,
Stevens demonstrated shrewd political skills. He often waited until key

72. United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 355 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff’d, 520
F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975).
73. COHEN, supra note 19, at 36.
74. See RICHARDS, supra note 67.
75. Letter from Anson Dart, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to L[uke] Lea, Comm’r
of Indian Affairs (July 19, 1851) (U.S. Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of
Indian Affairs, 1824–1880, Nat’l Archives Microcopy 234, Roll 607, NADP Doc. D10, available
at http://www.csusm.edu/nadp/d10.htm). This is one of several letters written by Dart
when he resigned. In another letter, he implored the federal government to “not molest[]
the Indians, … but on the contrary, [to] treat them kindly.” Letter from Anson Dart,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, to [Indian Agent] Spalding (Mar. 1, 1851) (U.S. Off. of
Indian Affairs, Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824–1880, Nat’l Archives
Microcopy 234, Roll 607 (excerpt), NADP Doc. D7, available at http://www.csusm.edu/
nadp/d7.htm). He also called for deployment of federal troops to protect the Indians from
the settlers’ lawlessness, opining that “most of the difficulties with these Indians might
have been avoided, had a more conciliatory course been pursued on the part of the
whites.” Id.
76. Letter from Dart to Lea, supra note 75.
77. Recent estimates put the pre-treaty population losses due to white-induced
diseases for some tribes as high as 90 percent. BLUMM, supra note 16, at 4 (estimated
population decline between 1800 and 1834); TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 39–43. See generally
ROBERT BOYD, THE COMING OF THE SPIRIT OF PESTILENCE: INTRODUCED INFECTIOUS DISEASES
AND POPULATION DECLINE AMONG NORTHWEST INDIANS, 1774–1874 (1999).
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tribal members—usually chosen or appointed by Stevens himself—
gathered before addressing the Indians. When some tribal leaders
deferred a week or more, Stevens refused to begin the meeting or allow
signing unless the holdouts were brought into the council. This delay
frustrated the Indians and subtly turned them against each other.78 At
one such gathering, Stevens addressed an audience of some two
hundred Indians. Explaining the treaty language to his listeners, he
stated, “Are you not my children and also the children of the great father
[the President]?” He continued:
This paper is such as a man would give to his children and
I will tell you why. This paper gives you a home. Does not
a father give his children a home? This paper gives you a
school. Does not a father send his children to school? It
gives you mechanics and a doctor to teach and cure you. Is
not that fatherly? This paper secures your fish. Does not a
father give food to his children?79
Stevens appealed to the Indians’ sense of reason, as well as their
connectedness with the salmon, but he finessed the underlying meaning
of the treaty. Tribal people well understood the true significance of the
agreement, which was to clear Indian title from most of the lands of the
Pacific Northwest and to move the Indians onto small reservations. This
is why in treaty negotiations they fought tenaciously for recognition of
their historic fishing rights in off-reservation areas.
D. The Broken Treaty Promises
Stevens and Palmer largely succeeded in effecting a peaceful
mass transfer of property rights, but they failed to deal squarely with the
tribes in key respects. They enjoyed obvious unequal bargaining power
due to their wealth, perceived paternal superiority, military power, and
language barriers (the treaties were written in English before
negotiations began and translated to the tribes in a simple Chinook
jargon that many tribes did not understand).80 Although the treaties
recognized the ancient fishing, hunting, and gathering rights so crucial to
the tribes, the documents were silent about how these rights would be
78. Examples of the friction caused by the close quarters, holdouts, delays, and
differing tribal perspectives are documented first hand in Stevens’ journal. See DOTY, supra
note 51, at 26–28.
79. See THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 177 (Joseph Cone &
Sandy Ridlington eds., 1996) (emphasis added).
80. Chinook jargon is a simple lexicon; it is quite doubtful that its 300-word vocabulary
was sufficient to convey the subtle nuances involved in land alienation. See BLUMM, supra
note 16, at 60.
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protected. Already, access to fishing sites was jeopardized by non-Indian
fee ownership of riverfront land. Soon, white-owned industrial interests
would compromise the fishing right.
Just two weeks after completing the Walla Walla Council,
Stevens advertised in the Oregon Weekly Times that the Cascade Territory
was open for settlement.81 The treaties were not yet effective, however,
since Congress had yet to ratify them.82 In fact, Stevens’ haste in
announcing the availability of the lands led, ironically, to delay in the
termination of Indian title by treaty ratification. Violent friction ensued
between Indians and the first wave of settlers, who ignored the Indian
title. This violence lingered through 1858, delaying ratification of some
treaties by Congress until 1859.83
By 1861, the Indians had vacated most of the ceded lands and
had ceased much of their seasonal migration. They began the long, slow
process of attempting to “civilize” themselves on reservations. Bands
that had never cohabitated were often commingled on one reservation.
The treaties promised federal funds, first for the “breaking up and
fencing of farms,” then for schools, shops, farm equipment, mills, and
hospitals.84 Over the next few decades, commentators remarked on the
progress of the “conquered people,” who, despite their “dull” minds and
“savage” character, were attempting a civilized agrarian existence.85 But
this existence was certainly not one they chose; it was forced upon them.
The Indians were persecuted if they pursued traditional native economic
or religious practices.86 One of the few remaining native cultural
protections in the treaties was the salmon harvest, a practice to which the
tribes clung tenaciously.
Ironically, the treaties that had been designed to assimilate the
tribes became their chief weapon in their fight to protect their ancient
81. Barbara Grace Liebhardt, Law, Environment, and Social Change in the Columbia
River Basin: The Yakima Indian Nation as a Case Study, 1840–1933, at 118 (Nov. 19, 1990)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley).
82. In the case of the Yakima Treaty at issue in Winans, the Senate did not ratify it until
March 8, 1859. Treaty with the Yakima, supra note 13.
83. Or. Historical Records Survey, Div. of Prof’l & Serv. Projects, Work Projects
Admin., Inventory of the County Archives of Oregon: No. 33, Wasco County (The Dalles)
22 (Feb. 1941) (Official Project No. 65-1-94-25, unpublished document, on file with the
Oregon Historical Society Research Library) (noting the delay of a “series of treaties”); AM.
FRIENDS SERV. COMM., supra note 67, at 36 (describing how General John E. Wool,
commander of the Department of the Pacific of the U.S. Army, “argued that if…[militia]
volunteers stopped provoking the Indians,” the Indians would “become peaceful”). On the
post-treaty violence, see Liebhardt, supra note 81, at 118–19.
84. Treaty with the Yakima, supra note 13, art. IV.
85. See, e.g., A.H., Yakima Indians: Their New Civilization Closely Inspected, OREGONIAN,
Apr. 2, 1885.
86. HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 275.
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ways. Article III of the treaties typically “secured…the right of taking
fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the
territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them.”87 This
reserved right did not seem problematic at treaty time because the land
seemed inexhaustible and the fish plentiful. But the next quarter-century
would bring sweeping changes. By 1884, native fishing rights would
collide with settlers’ perceived land rights, a conflict that would require
judicial resolution. For more than the next century, the meaning of the
treaty words “the right of taking fish in common with” would be
debated and litigated. Did these words recognize no special Indian rights
beyond those enjoyed by white settlers? Or did the treaty language
indicate that Indians had reserved special proprietary rights to fish in
order to allow them to practice their ancient ways?88 A way of life hung
on the interpretation of this treaty language.
IV. THE POST-TREATY ERA: OVERCROWDING AND
DIMINISHED SALMON RUNS
Article III’s recognition of the Indians’ historical fishing practices
was soon overwhelmed by the rapid white settlement of the region,
which threatened not only the Indian way of life, but also the salmon
runs on which that culture depended. First mining and grazing and then
efficient harvesting methods and unsustainable harvest levels threatened
the salmon runs. Next, Indians and whites came into physical and
courtroom conflict over access to prime fishing sites.89
A. Logging, Mining, and Grazing
As the region became increasingly crowded with settlers and
their resource-extractive industries, river quality declined rapidly and
tribal access to historic fishing places dwindled. Logging severely
87. Treaty with the Yakima, supra note 13, art. III.
88. Compare United States v. Winans, 73 F. 72, 74 (D. Wash. 1896) (no special right) with
Washington v. Wash. State Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 681–82
(1979) (in addition to an access right, treaty Indians also reserved a share of the harvest).
89. The first recorded case involving treaty-fishing access introduced the locus of what
would later become the Winans case, a fishery known to whites as “Tumwater” and to
natives as “Wisham” or “See-we-pam.” Spedis v. Simpson (Klickitat County Ct. July 22,
1884) (located at Klickitat County, Wash. Archive, File KLK-126). Spedis, Taylor, and Winans
all stemmed from access disputes at the Tumwater fishery. See Transcript of Record at 157–
68, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180) (testimony of Frank P. Taylor); id.
at 44–50 (testimony of Thomas Simpson); id. at 227–29 (Stipulations). See also BRAD ASHER,
BEYOND THE RESERVATION: INDIANS, SETTLERS, AND THE LAW IN WASHINGTON TERRITORY,
1853–1889, at 150–53 (1999) (discussing Spedis and placing it in the context of the “legal
culture of the Indians in Washington Territory”).
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damaged salmon populations. Although less than two-dozen sawmills
operated along the rivers of western Oregon and Washington in 1848,
just three years later over a hundred mills choked rivers with gillclogging dust and debris. Logjams blocked access to spawning grounds
and raised water temperatures, and runoff from clearcut hillsides
polluted breeding and rearing grounds.90 “Splash dams,” used for log
transport, held back spring flows and then released them suddenly,
inflicting periodic tumultuous poundings that destroyed spawning and
rearing habitats as well as fishing sites.91
Miners seeking prime streamside real estate displaced or even
attacked many permanent, ancient Indian villages on rocky terraces and
fertile flat plots near streams.92 Salmon, trout, eel, crayfish, and
freshwater mussels all suffered sharp declines due to water pollution
and temperature changes caused by soil displacement from mining and
grazing. Some fish were pulverized as they passed through mining
pumps, dams, and spray nozzles.93 Cattle overgrazing destroyed
streamside vegetation, resulting in increased water temperatures and
less shelter from predation.94
B. The Birth of the Canning Industry
Until the invention of canned foods, salmon products were an
exotic asterisk appendage to the much larger fur, mining, and logging
trades.95 By the mid-1860s, the first cannery had come to the West Coast,
changing the fate of Indian fishing forever.96 The industrial revolution
and a robust American economy fueled investment in canneries.97 The
construction of the transcontinental railroad provided the means for

90. LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 60–62.
91. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 56–57.
92. Id. at 44.
93. Id. at 51. See also Stephen Dow Beckham, Oregon History—Indian Wars, http://
bluebook.state.or.us/cultural/history/history14.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2004).
94. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 54–55.
95. The Hudson Bay Company first exported salmon in 1827 and 1829. Under an
experiment conducted by Dr. John McLaughlin, Indian-caught fish at Fort Vancouver (now
Kelley Point Park in Portland) were salted; repeatedly soaked in briny, super-saturated
saltwater; packed into wooden casks; and shipped to Monterey, California, and to New
York as “salt salmon.” These shipments were unsuccessful: the fish tasted bad and kept for
only a few weeks and import taxes made the salt salmon prohibitively expensive. Later, the
Hudson Bay Company used a streamlined distribution infrastructure to sell salmon in their
stores throughout England as a boutique specialty item. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 60. The
first American operation in 1829 was similarly short-lived, operating for only one season.
LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 82.
96. LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 85–87.
97. Id.
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global distribution of a seemingly endless stream of this highly
marketable, preserved delicacy.98
By 1884, less than three decades after the signing of the treaties,
37 canneries operated along the Columbia River.99 Few employees were
Indian, and no cannery was Indian-owned.100 Commercial harvesters
hired whites and Chinese who emigrated in response to the fishing
boom. Near the mouth of the Columbia, commercial fishermen worked
long hours in fleets of boats with butterfly-shaped sails, towing gillnets.
At the mouths of tributaries, they stretched weirs, or salmon dams, some
of which captured virtually every salmon swimming upstream.101 As a
result, far fewer fish made it upstream to the Indians’ dipnets and
spearfishing ponds. By 1884, the scream and thunder of steam engines
and the roar of booming railroad commerce reverberated through the
Columbia River Gorge. The railroads provided a rapid conduit through
which an export explosion of salmon and other resources flowed.102
C. Technological Preemption of Indian Harvests: Fishwheels and
Motorized Fleets
In 1879, whites introduced the first fishwheel on the
Columbia.103 A kind of mechanized dipnet, the fishwheel was a
formidable wood and steel structure that towered high over the heads of
its operators, scooping ton after ton of salmon from the river. For the first
time, the mighty Columbia was in danger of being over-harvested, as the
new machines targeted geographically concentrated populations of
specific salmon runs.104 Salmon dams corralled the fish into the path of
giant scoops, which tossed nearly the entire salmon run out of the river
and into heaps on the shore or decks. An average fishwheel scooped 40
to 50 tons of salmon each season.105 By comparison, native fishing
98. See TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 64.
99. Id. at 137.
100. LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 98–100.
101. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 64. Though aboriginal fishers had also used weirs, the
cultural context and scope of their use led to more sustainable effect than weir use in the
post-cannery times. Indians imposed limits on weir and net use. LICHATOWICH, supra note
14, at 39; TAYLOR, supra at 65.
102. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 52, 64 (“[F]ishmongers harnessed…railroads to create a
global market for salmon.”).
103. IVAN J. DONALDSON & FREDERICK K. CRAMER, FISHWHEELS OF THE COLUMBIA 7
(1971).
104. BLUMM, supra note 16, at 53; see also TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 63–64.
105. ANTHONY NETBOY, THE COLUMBIA RIVER SALMON AND STEELHEAD TROUT: THEIR
FIGHT FOR SURVIVAL 28 (1980); THE NORTHWEST SALMON CRISIS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 79, at 184. One monster wheel, owned by the Seufert Brothers (later important
litigants), landed a whopping 70,000 pounds in one day. Id. at 11.
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methods were far less wasteful, much more geographically and
temporally dispersed, and, thus, more sustainable.106
By the turn of the century, at least 76 wheels operated on the
Columbia.107 Canneries processed salmon around the clock but could not
keep up with the fishwheels’ pace. Thus, large piles of fish lay rotting.108
As early as 1888, newspaper editorials debated whether wheels were “so
destructive to our [fish] supply…that they should be prohibited.”109 One
Indian agent reported that an entire salmon run had been captured by a
wheel, thereby starving the upriver Palouse tribe, which depended on
the run for subsistence.110
In 1898, as the Winans case was working its way through the
courts, gasoline-powered fishing boats were introduced in the lower
Columbia and in the ocean. These fleets netted large percentages of
salmon runs offshore, before they reached fresh water. The race to
harvest salmon thus turned from the rivers to the ocean, partially
preempting both Indian fishing industry and white-owned fish wheels
as well. A large portion of the salmon industry was now in the hands of
the few that could afford offshore boats.111
Industrial fishing methods and export profits transformed
salmon in only a decade or so from a cherished delicacy to a meat
product produced on a massive scale.112 By 1885, the Columbia Basin
supported a bourgeoning global export of this fragile natural resource.
Although salmon seemed bountiful, their complex life cycles required a
carefully balanced harvest. No such balance was attempted in the
nineteenth century, however, and the salmon runs declined rapidly
under the combined stresses of overfishing, pollution, and habitat
destruction from mining, logging, and grazing.113 The number of
106. BLUMM, supra note 16, at 66; TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 63.
107. DONALDSON & CRAMER, supra note 103, at 7.
108. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 64.
109. L.H., Our Fishing Interests: Are Wheels a Part of a Legitimate Business?, MORNING
OREGONIAN, Dec. 19, 1888. The British author Rudyard Kipling was astounded at the mass
of flesh being dumped onto the deck, commenting, after a profanity or two, “Think of the
black and bloody murder of it[!]” DONALDSON & CRAMER, supra note 104, at 7.
110. L.T. Erwin, Annual Report of Yakima Agency, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 297, 299 (1897), available at http://content.lib.washington.edu/cgi-bin/
docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lctext&CISOPTR=1160. Agent Erwin resigned that year. Id. at
298. In the 1894 report, Agent Erwin “strongly urge[d]” the Department of the Interior to
take “definite and decisive action…to restore to the Indians their fishery rights [as the
treaty provides].” L.T. Erwin, Annual Report of Yakima Agency, REPORT OF THE
COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 325, 326 (1894), available at http://content.lib.
washington.edu/cgi-bin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lctext&CISOPTR=1088.
111. See LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 109–10.
112. From 1866 to 1884, the total Columbia River salmon catch went from 272 tons to
over 150 times that amount: 42,160 thousands of pounds. TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 122.
113. See LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 63–71; TAYLOR, supra note 18, at 50–57.
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canneries on the Columbia peaked in 1887; by 1910, most had closed.114
Thus, the explosive salmon “boom” of the late nineteenth century was
followed by a deep “bust” in the early twentieth century, which was felt
acutely by tribal people, whose sustenance and culture were jeopardized.
D. Legal and Geographical Preemption of Indian Harvests
In a misguided effort to promote sustainable harvests, beginning
around 1880, regulatory commissions in both Oregon and Washington
instituted “salmon preserves” and a number of other restrictions such as
net-size limits and seasonal closures that applied to fishing in rivers and
streams but left off-shore fishing virtually unregulated.115 This
impediment to the exercise of treaty rights effectively preempted the
inland Indian harvest in a regulatory sense.
At the same time, scarcity and increasing access difficulties
worked a geographic preemption. Indian fishing became an outmoded,
endangered practice, no longer an important part of the salmon industry.
Yet Indians tenaciously returned to their traditional fishing spots, where
salmon were now scarce, and new, non-Indian landowners made access
difficult.116 A deepening conflict developed between Indians and white
fee simple owners, who regarded the Indians as trespassers and
troublemakers. Traditional, dependable sustenance fishing became a
tenuous contentious right, as some Indian sites disappeared and others
were taken over by white-owned fishing operations.117 Tribal fishermen
with dipnets and seines were an anachronistic inconvenience to the
streamlined fishwheel operations. Whites erected fences around
traditional fishing grounds like Tumwater, blocking permanent access
paths, right before the eyes of frustrated natives who had fished on those
sites their entire lives.118

114. Liebhardt, supra note 81, at 456. From 1883 to 1889, a period of massive overfishing, while the number and inefficiency of the salmon canneries increased, their
production plummeted from 43 million pounds to 21 million pounds. TAYLOR, supra note
18, at 122.
115. See LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 103–04; COHEN, supra note 19, at 42–43; NETBOY,
supra note 105, at 34–36; BLUMM, supra note 16, at 6–7.
116. See United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333, 335–36 (Wash. Terr. 1887) (“The court knows
as a matter of common knowledge that these Indians were always tenacious in adhering to
past customs and traditions.”).
117. See LICHATOWICH, supra note 14, at 101; Letter from George W. Gordon, U.S.
Special Indian Agent, to the Comm’r of Indian Affairs (Jan. 19, 1889) (on file with the
National Archives) [hereinafter Gordon Letter].
118. See Taylor, 13 P. at 333–34; Transcript of Record passim, United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905).
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E. The Spedis Case
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, intervention by
federal Indian agents became increasingly necessary to protect treaty
fishing rights.119 Tension festered at many historic Indian fishing sites
and altercations resulted from whites encroaching upon Article III
fishing rights.120 A certain plot of land near the Tumwater fishery
became the legal battleground for these conflicts, serving as the locus of
both the Taylor and Winans cases.121
Yakama agent Robert H. Milroy was often the on-site enforcer of
treaty fishing rights as members of the Yakama reservation frequented
the fishery.122 A fierce advocate for Indian fishermen, Milroy’s reports to
the Bureau of Indian Affairs showed him to be a proponent of Indian
citizenship and a defender of the allotment of reservation land into
private ownership.123 In his short tenure as Yakima agent—he was
suspended by President Cleveland in 1885—Milroy stressed that
reservations were only a “temporary expedient” aimed at solving the
“Indian problem” by “put[ting] up barriers against the inexhaustible
greed of the white man from gobbling up all arable lands.”124 According
to Milroy, the failure of the agrarian model on-reservation caused most
Indians to access fishing sites beyond their reservations in pursuit of
salmon.125 He maintained that the earlier threat of war no longer
required the insulation of reservations, and he implored the federal
119. The tensions at fishing sites led the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to dispatch
special federal Indian agent George W. Gordon, who documented the state of affairs at
each of the major sites in the 1888 “Gordon Report,” which later became an important
document in future fishing rights cases. Gordon Letter, supra note 117.
120. Treaty with the Yakima, art. 3, 12 Stat. 951 (June 9, 1885).
121. Taylor, 13 P. 333; Winans, 198 U.S. 371.
122. Letter from R.H. Milroy, Indian Agent, to H. Price, Comm’r of Indian Affairs (Aug.
22, 1884) (on file with Klickitat County, Wash., Archive) [hereinafter Milroy Letter]. Milroy
was a Progressive Republican who fought for citizenship for homesteading Indians and
helped resolve individual disputes. ASHER, supra note 89, at 49–51, 76–78. Milory was not
so much concerned with the fulfillment of treaty promises—he described the treaty as a
“rude agreement from thirty years ago, called a treaty”—but with the survival of the
Indians. See R.H. Milroy, Annual Report of Yakima Agency, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 196, 202–03 (1885) available at http://content.lib.washington.edu/cgibin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lctext&CISOPTR=883. See also R.H. Milroy, Annual
Report of Yakima Agency, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 171 (1884),
available at http://content.lib.washington.edu/cgi-bin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lc
text&CISOPTR=862 [hereinafter 1884 Report of Yakima Agency].
123. See R.H. Milroy, Annual Report of Yakima Agency, REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS 196, 203–04 (1885), available at http://content.lib.washington.edu/cgibin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lctext&CISOPTR=883.
124. 1884 Report of Yakima Agency, supra note 122, at 203–04.
125. Id. at 173.
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government to grant riverfront land to the tribes so that their fishing
culture could be saved from the “avaricious hordes of white fishermen”
responsible for the “rapidly diminished” salmon supply.126
The Spedis v. Simpson127 controversy demonstrated Milroy’s
deepening conviction that fisheries should be protected. In Spedis, a
white landowner used the federal guardian role to pit Indians against
one another; he manufactured a conflict, and then sought to resolve it by
selling his land to the federal government at a windfall profit.128
In 1884, Frank Taylor purchased a land patent for acreage
adjacent to the ancient Tumwater fishery from a homesteader.129 He
immediately erected a fence and hired a few local Indians to keep other
Indians from accessing their traditional fishing spots. He then leased the
exclusive right to fish the site to one Indian, William Spedis. This
arrangement incited a dispute in short order. For several weeks, Spedis
denied access to native fishermen, who in turn filed complaints with
Milroy, the Yakama Indian agent.130 The conflict came to a head when
Spedis forcibly tied up one particularly assertive Indian fisher and held
him against his will.131 In response, a small group of Indians functioning
as the Yakama Reservation Police and acting under Milroy’s order
handcuffed and removed Spedis to the Yakama reservation, treated him
roughly, and held him until Milroy showed up and released him.132
Spedis then successfully sued Indian police member Thomas Simpson
(later, the first named individual plaintiff in Winans),133 and five other
members of the Yakama police force for holding him against his will and

126. Id. at 172.
127. Complaint, Spedis v. Simpson, Klickitat County Ct. (July 22, 1884) (Case KLK-26)
(on file with Klickitat County, Wash., Archive).
128. Milroy Letter, supra note 122.
129. Id.
130. Id. The Yakama Nation changed the spelling of its name from “Yakima” in 1993.
This article employs that spelling, except with respect to the name of the 1855 treaty.
131. Allegedly, Spedis used more force than necessary. Complaint, Spedis v. Simpson,
Klickitat County Ct. (July 22, 1884) (Case KLK-26) (on file with Klickitat County, Wash.,
Archive).
132. Id.
133. According to his testimony, Simpson grew up on the plot of land where the
fishwheels stood. Transcript of Record at 44, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)
(No. 180).

24

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

causing him “great pain in body and mind, and…great humiliation.”134
A jury awarded Spedis $500 in damages.135
The Spedis case reflected the precarious state of treaty fishing
rights in the late nineteenth century and led directly to subsequent cases
fought by similarly situated litigants that changed the course of treaty
interpretation and Indian fishing.136 The treaties were only 30 years old,
but already their general ineffectiveness was clear; the first case to take
the Article III rights to court was a contrived, violent, Indian-againstIndian controversy. Milroy’s letters indicate that the Spedis case was
emblematic of white manipulation of the Indians.137 It would take over
two decades, an ineffective decree in the Taylor case (described in section
V, below), and a decisive victory for the tribes in Winans before the
Indians would obtain judicial protection of their treaty fishing rights.
During the Spedis case, The Oregonian cited repeated conflicts,
similar to those at the Tumwater fishery, between operators and Indian
fishermen at a large fishwheel and supply platform at Celilo Falls.138
Reportedly, the platform’s owner offered to sell the land to the federal
government in order to resolve the conflict, at a price to be agreed upon
by arbitration. But before these negotiations could begin, an arsonist’s
fire razed the fully insured station after it had operated for only a few
months.139 The paper’s coverage of the event reflects the view of the
popular press of the day:
134. Spedis sought $5,000 in damages from Milroy’s officers in district court. See
Complaint, Spedis v. Simpson, Klickitat County Ct. (July 22, 1884) (Case KLK-26) (on file
with Klickitat County, Wash., Archive). According to the complaint by Spedis, “(the
officers) did maliciously…violently…assault, beat, bruise…maim…and maltreat the
plaintiff…and deprive him of his liberty for a long time.” Id.
135. The $500 jury award remained uncollected until a forced sale of one of the
defendants’ belongings three years later brought $156.76. See ASHER, supra note 89, at 150–
52. According to Agent Milroy, after the Spedis case, his agents were “careful to use no
further violence (than necessary)” (the words “than necessary” were crammed into the
margins of a handwritten note). Milroy Letter, supra note 122.
136. The conflicts in both Taylor and Winans originated at the same fishing site—the
Tumwater fishery, at the foot of Celilo Falls—and Frank Taylor, the landowner, appeared
as a witness in both Taylor and Winans. See, e.g., Transcript of Record at 265, Winans, 198
U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180).
137. Both Spedis and Simpson appeared for the plaintiffs in the Winans proceedings. See
id. at 86, 176, 186. The patronizing tenor of white-Indian relations of the era is also reflected
by Milroy’s choice of possessive pronouns when referring to the conflict: he referred to the
unnamed fisherman (tied up by Spedis) as “my Indian” and used the term “Taylor and his
Indians,” not the name “Spedis,” when referring to acts by Spedis. Moreover, Milroy
alleged that the motivation for the Spedis lawsuit—funded by Taylor—was “part of
[Taylor’s] tactics to compel the Department (of the Interior) to purchase his claim to the
fishery, and pay him ten times its value.” Milroy Letter, supra note 123, at 3. See also ASHER,
supra note 89, at 72.
138. The Celilo Fishery, THE OREGONIAN, Oct. 18, 1884.
139. Id.
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[A] treaty was made at one time giving [the Indians] the
right [to fish]. This treaty expired in 1856 (sic), and they have
continued to fish there ever since without hinderance….The
Indians began murmuring as soon as they saw an attempt
made to interfere with what they considered their rights in
the premises[, and they] became unpleasantly obnoxious.
Threats were made of murder, arson and other crimes
unless they were allowed to have their own way.…[T]he
diaffected (sic) savages…said they would stay there until
they were killed before leaving willingly.140
The reporter erroneously opined that, because the parcel in question had
been granted to the state as a “school lot” upon statehood in 1859, it was
no longer burdened by the rights secured by the treaty.141 The Supreme
Court would reject this reasoning even before hearing the Winans case.142
F. The Allotment Era
With tribal populations decimated by disease and settlers
populating the region with vigor,143 Indian lands became increasingly
coveted by whites. According to The Oregonian in 1885, the Yakama
reservation was “a magnificent country, which could support a
population of 30,000 in comfort and plenty,” but which was “lying [in]
waste in the hands of a few hundred Indians.”144 Agent Milroy made
similar observations in his reports.145 Settlers’ eyes widened at the
prospect of acquiring “surplus” lands allegedly slept on by the
remaining Indians.
The Dawes Act of 1887 made such sales possible. The statute
announced the federal government’s desire that Indians abandon
tribalism and communistic property ownership control by allotting
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. The notion that the federal government could not convey or reserve lands
subsequently the subject of state claims under Statehood Acts was rejected by the Supreme
Court in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894) (ruling that the federal government could
reserve submerged lands under navigable waters prior to statehood if it did so clearly and
for important public purposes). Recent applications of this rule include Idaho v. United
States, 533 U.S. 262, 272 (2001) (concerning the government’s pre-statehood reservation of
the Coeur d’Alene lakebed for the Coeur d’Alene tribe’s reservation); and United States v.
Alaska, 521 U.S. 1, 33 (1997) (concerning the government’s pre-statehood reservation of
lands offshore of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in the Beaufort Sea).
143. In less than a half-century, native populations decreased by as much as 95 percent,
and non-natives had increased in number by 800 percent. BLUMM, supra note 16, at 65.
144. A.H., supra note 85.
145. 1884 Report of Yakima Agency, supra note 122, at 171–73.
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parcels of land to individual Indians, who could then sell their property
after proving themselves to be fully “civilized.”146 Described by
President Theodore Roosevelt as “a mighty pulverizing engine to break
up the tribal mass,”147 the Dawes Act ensured that large chunks of tribal
lands made their way into non-Indian hands.148 Consequently, the
Puyallup Tribe lost virtually all of its riverside property.149 The Yakama
Reservation became home to three non-Indian towns by 1907, as tens of
thousands of acres of prime irrigated farmland were conveyed to nonnatives.150 Over the next century, the Dawes Act would continue to cast
its shadow on tribal fishing rights as well, as the settlers, under state law,
diverted water from streams for irrigation, reducing fish habitat and
contributing to declining salmon runs.151
Indian land reservations diminished under policies of allotment,
but the Dawes Act and ensuing allotment statutes made no mention of
the treaty “right of taking fish.” The federal government encouraged the
civilization of tribes by allowing them to alienate their land holdings, but
simultaneously federal agents like Robert Milroy fought to preserve
ancient fishing practices that seemed to contradict the federal goal of
converting Indians into agrarians. The best explanation for this
dichotomy lies in the reports of Indian agents; they show that the
reservations failed miserably as training centers for Jeffersonian
yeomen.152 As buffers for keeping potential conflict at bay, however,
reservations succeeded to the point of no longer being necessary.
According to Agent Milroy, whites had peacefully surrounded the
reservations by the 1880s, inhabiting most of the arable land with little or
no conflict with natives.153 As a result, the reservations’ peacekeeping
function apparently was no longer necessary. The agents’ reports also
reveal that the federal government was made aware of the rapid physical
146. General Allotment Act (Dawes Act), 24 Stat. 388 (1887). See generally Royster, supra
note 5.
147. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON & ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 196 (2005).
148. See JUDITH V. ROYSTER & MICHAEL C. BLUMM, NATIVE AMERICAN NATURAL
RESOURCES LAW 40 (2002) (By 1934, the end of the allotment era, two-thirds of allotted
lands—some 27 million acres—had fallen into non-Indian ownership.).
149. COHEN, supra note 19, at 53.
150. HUNN & SELAM, supra note 17, at 278–79.
151. Perhaps the classic Indian fishing versus settler irrigation case is Nevada v. United
States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983), where a fractured Supreme Court, per Justice Rehnquist, ruled
that the federal government and the Pyramid Lake Pauite Tribe could not reopen a 1944
court decree in which the federal government failed to ask for sufficient water to sustain
the tribe’s treaty rights to fish in Pyramid Lake. Numerous such fish versus irrigation cases
are collected in ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 148, at 394–461.
152. See 1884 Report of Yakima Agency, supra note 122, at 152–53.
153. See id.
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and legal displacement of the Indians from their ancient fishing sites and
the loss of crucial cultural and economic practices.154 Surprisingly, the
allotment-era policy of breaking up reservations and their tribal
communism resulted in tolerance and support for aboriginal fishing, at
least among government agents. Fishing offered the Indians an
opportunity to develop commercial enterprises, or at least maintain
subsistence fishing.
White fee owners and tribal fishermen were philosophically at
odds in many respects. The native ideal of a fishing site as the hub of a
great communal banquet table, reflective of a holistic spiritual system of
nature and stewardship, conflicted with private land ownership
paradigms in which trespassing Indians chipped away at profits. While
the native gift economy had built-in spiritual, social, and geographical
checks to regulate the harvest from within,155 commodification of the
salmon resource resulted in over-harvesting and waste in pursuit of fast
profits from distant markets. The sight of dipnet fishermen working the
rocks and pools was an eyesore for whites, who preferred less chaotic
and neatly organized gardens and orchards and efficient, profitable,
mechanized fishing operations like fishwheels. Whites complained of
unlawful timber-cutting,156 noise, theft, trespassing, and other problems
resulting from the Indian presence at fishing sites: according to one
account, “The Indians…have been a troublesome, drunken lot of
fellows” wrote one fishery manager.157 The stage was set for an epic legal
battle over access to fishing sites.

154. After Agent Milroy’s suspension in 1885, several of his Indian Agent successors at
the Yakama Reservation were dismissed in short order after each pleaded to the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs for assistance in resolving the problems at the fisheries. It
is probably no coincidence that, after Agent Jay Lynch was appointed to the post in 1898,
he proceeded to omit from his reports any reference at all to the ongoing legal struggles at
Columbia Basin fisheries for nearly ten years. See Reports of Agents in Washington
Territory and Reports of Agents in Washington, available at http://content.lib.
washington.edu/cgi-bin/queryresults.exe?fg=&CISOOP1=all&CISOBOX1=Yakima+lynch
&CISOFIELD1=CISOSEARCHALL&CISOOP2=exact&CISOBOX2=&CISOFIELD2=CISOSE
ARCHALL&CISOOP3=any&CISOBOX3=&CISOFIELD3=CISOSEARCHALL&CISOOP4=n
one&CISOBOX4=&CISOFIELD4=CISOSEARCHALL&cisobox1=yakima+lynch&cisobox2=
&cisobox3=&cisobox4=&searchall=on&CISOROOT=all.
155. See BLUMM, supra note 16, at 65–66.
156. Letter from W.H. Holcomb to George W. Gordon, Special Indian Agent (Aug. 14,
1888) (on file with the Nat’l Archives, File: Gordon Report). The Indians needed to cut
small trees in order to build temporary shelter, smoke-racks, and dip nets. Id.
157. Letter from W.H. Holcomb, Gen. Manger, to George W. Gordon, U.S. Indian Agent
(Aug. 14, 1888) (on file with the Natl. Archives, File: Gordon Report).
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V. THE TAYLOR CASE: FENCING OUT TRIBAL FISHERS
At the Tumwater fishery, tensions continued to run high
throughout the 1880s. Frank Taylor sold his 160-acre parcel to a Baptist
minister named Orson Daton Taylor, who was not related to Frank.158
O.D. Taylor was a shrewd opportunist who had traveled to the Dalles
under the veneer of missionary altruism, taking charge of the Baptist
Church there in 1880.159 Within two years, he turned from preaching the
gospel to buying and selling riverfront land, including the contentious
location of the Spedis case, at the foot of the rapids below Celilo Falls.160
The minister then evicted tribal fishermen in order to make room for
white fishermen, who promised profitable returns as tenants.
Consequently, Taylor strung barbed wire across Indian trails, burned
down some of their temporary structures, appropriated others for his
own use, and threatened Indians with arrest.161 He also dynamited the
rocky shore to carve out space for four large fish wheels, obliterating
several prime native fishing spots.162 The Tumwater plot was already
embroiled in legal battles when O.D. Taylor acquired it,163 and the
Taylors’ desires to fence out the Indians would produce the first judicial
interpretation of the meaning of the promises contained in article III of
the treaties.
A. Agent Milroy’s Suit for an Injunction against Taylor’s Fence
Recalling the Spedis incident of 1884, Agent Milroy and several
Yakama tribal members immediately sought an injunction in federal
158. There was no blood relationship between the two Taylors.
159. AN ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF KLICKITAT, YAKIMA, AND KITTITAS COUNTIES: WITH AN
OUTLINE OF THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 111 (1904).
160. By the end of the century, O.D. Taylor became a notorious land swindler and failed
developer who was run out of town on fraud charges. Although convicted of fraud, the
conviction was later overturned on a technicality. See Jeffrey L. Elmer, Shoe Factory: A Story
of Boom and Bust, DALLES CHRON., June 2, 1959, at E2, available at http://home
pages.rootsweb.com/~westklic/shoe.html. See generally supra note 160.
161. Gordon Letter, supra note 117. It is likely that, after O.D. purchased the plot in 1892,
he merely continued the practices of Frank Taylor. The transcript of record of the Winans
case describes abuses and intimidation tactics against Indians at the Tumwater fishery.
Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 56, 70 (testimony of Charley Dick); id. at 68
(testimony of Winneer); id. at 83 (testimony of Joe Ko-Lock-en); id. at 85 (testimony of
Charley Cath-lum-it); id. at 91 (testimony of Bill Charley); id. at 100 (testimony of William
Speedies (Spedis)); id. at 105 (testimony of Charley Winnear). For a list of sources, see
Leibhardt, supra note 81, at 356.
162. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 47–49 (testimony of Thomas Simpson).
163. See Plaintiff’s Brief at 35, Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905) (No. 180) (noting that a
warranty deed did not pass from Frank Taylor to subsequent purchasers due to the
pending litigation).
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district court against Taylor to prevent him from fencing off the
Tumwater fishery at Celilo,164 claiming that the fence obstructed their
access to the fishery and prevented their exercise of treaty fishing rights.
Citing Article III of the 1855 treaty, the government argued that Indian
fishermen possessed a “right of way with free access from [the
reservation]…to the nearest public highway, …[and] also the right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with the
citizens of the territory, and of erecting temporary buildings for curing
them.”165 Judge George Turner of the Washington district court in North
Yakima held for Frank Taylor, allowing him to keep his fence.166
Milroy nevertheless pressed on, convincing U.S. attorneys W.H.
White and John B. Allen to appeal to the Washington Territorial
Supreme Court in July 1884. Milroy reported that, “after trying in vain
by reason to obtain for the Indians free access to said fisheries, I had to
resort to law.”167 Before the territorial high court, the U.S. attorneys
argued that the treaty provisions should be interpreted to include an
implied access easement across Taylor’s land and that the fence blocked
the exercise of this right and therefore violated the Yakama’s treaty
rights.168
Frank Taylor’s lawyers, William Lair Hill169 and F.P. Mays,170
advanced two theories in his defense. First, they claimed that the
government’s granting of patents under the Homestead Act171 abrogated
the Yakama’s fishing rights. Hill and Mays maintained that because
Indians, like whites, had an opportunity to acquire a fishing right by
homesteading on the river, they could have secured the fishing site in
fee, but instead they slept on that opportunity.172 Since the homestead
patents were in conflict with a claim of treaty-based access easements,
164. ASHER, supra note 89, at 151.
165. Government Complaint, United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 89 (1887).
166. Judge Turner did not write an opinion. ASHER, supra note 89, at 151; United States
v. Taylor, 13 P. 333 (1887); Milroy Letter, supra note 122, at 41 (explaining that O.D. Taylor
claimed the land as Milroy readied his appeal).
167. 1884 Report of Yakima Agency, supra note 122, at 175.
168. United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 91 (1887).
169. A Grant County judge and former editor-in-chief of The Oregonian, Hill was known
for codifying the laws of Oregon and Washington into their first cohesive volumes. See THE
CODES AND GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON (William Lair Hill ed., 1887).
170. Mays later represented the Winans brothers in the case that bears their name,
teaming with popular historian, lawyer, and judge Charles H. Carey, who was counsel for
the Northern Pacific Railroad during its western expansion and who later started the
prestigious Portland law firm now called Stoel Rives. See generally CHARLES H. CAREY, A
GENERAL HISTORY OF OREGON: THROUGH EARLY STATEHOOD (1971); Stoel Rives: Our
History, http://www.stoel.com/about.aspx?Show=961 (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
171. Act to Secure Homesteads to Actual Settlers on the Public Domain, ch. 75, 12 Stat.
392 (1862).
172. United States v. Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. 88, 92 (1887).
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the defense maintained that “a subsequent act of Congress [authorizing
the issuance of patents] in conflict with [a previous treaty’s] provisions
repeals it pro tanto by implication, just as if it were a previous act of
Congress instead of a treaty.”173 Thus, Taylor argued, treaty rights were
defeasible, ceasing to exist on parcels subject to the Homestead Act
patents. The government responded that the mere issuance of such
patents did not “deprive these Indians of a treaty right secured them.”174
Taylor’s second argument was that white property owners had
the right to exclude the Indians because exercise of the fishing right and
related activities was “in derogation” of a landowner’s right to exclusive
possession of his land.175 Under this view, continued treaty fishing access
and especially occupation for pasturing and curing were incompatible
with Taylor’s fee simple ownership. Taylor therefore asserted that he
should not be subject to what amounted to an unwritten easement on his
property. Besides, according to Taylor, the Indians had “a perfect means
of approach, by the common highways, to the navigable streams, and by
the navigable streams to the [site].”176
B. The Territorial Supreme Court Decision
In 1887, the Territorial Supreme Court unanimously reversed
Judge Turner. Justice John P. Hoyt wrote for the court, presciently
framing the central issue in terms of Indian intentions: “What did the
Indians intend to reserve to themselves by the words, …[the] ‘right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens
of the territory?’”177 Hoyt reasoned that the Yakama treaty must be
“liberally construed in favor of the Indians.” Moreover, the treaty
language should be interpreted in a way that would “best subserve (sic)
the object which the Indians at the time the treaty was made would have
been most likely to have desired and understood.”178 Over the next
century, courts would employ this reasoning to formulate canons of
173. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870); Appelant’s Brief, Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. at
93.
174. Appellant’s Brief, Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. at 91.
175. Appellee’s Brief, Taylor, 3 Wash. Terr. at 93.
176. Id. Although perhaps technically possible for the strongest paddlers to reach the
rocky shores and dip their nets, the 30-mile-per-hour rapids prevented this from being a
viable option for subsistence fishing or its appurtenant shoreline activities, as witnesses for
both parties testified.
177. United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333, 334–35 (Wash. Terr. 1887).
178. Id. (Here, Hoyt’s opinion reflected the government brief, which cited In Re Kansas
Indians, 72 U.S. 737 (1866), and Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832), for the principle of
liberal construction of treaties and The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. 616 (1870), and Taylor v.
Morton, 23 F. Cas. 784 (1855), for the presumption against subsequent acts of Congress
reversing a treaty provision)).
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treaty construction, interpretive devices employed by the judiciary to
compensate for the tribes’ unequal bargaining power at the time of the
treaties.179
The canons function in three ways: to resolve ambiguous
expressions in favor of the Indians,180 to interpret the treaty the way the
Indians would have understood,181 and to construe treaties liberally in
favor of the Indians.182 The seeds of the canons were sown in Chief
Justice Marshall’s interpretation of the Hopewell Treaty in Worcester v.
Georgia in 1832183 but gained prominence in modern Supreme Court
jurisprudence in the Winans case,184 where the government argued that
the issue “has been fully adjudicated in favor of the Indians” in the
Taylor decision.185
Justice Hoyt then articulated an early version of what is now
known as the “reserved rights” doctrine: “the Indians in making the
treaty…more likely…grant[ed] only such rights as they were to part
with, rather than…conveyed all, with the understanding that certain
[rights] were to be at once reconveyed to them.”186 Taylor argued that
such an expansive interpretation of the treaty-recognized right would
conflict with his fee ownership by reserving to the Indians a right to
engage in any conceivable future fishing practices, including creating
new “usual and accustomed” sites.187 Justice Hoyt observed that Taylor’s
interpretation would create a “floating servitude,” effectively suffocating
future fee owners’ exercise of their ownership rights, a result he claimed
the United States would never have intended.188 Here, Justice Hoyt
interpreted the treaty according to the federal government’s likely
understanding, thus inverting the treaty canon that counsels the
judiciary to interpret treaties the way the tribes would have understood.
But this interpretation actually worked in the Indians’ favor, since it
179. See COHEN, supra note 4, § 2.02.
180. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Winters
v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1908).
181. See, e.g., United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905); Choctaw Nation v.
Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832).
182. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943);
Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684–85 (1942). On the treaty canons, see generally
Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty Abrogation: “As
long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth”—How Long a Time Is That? 63 CAL. L.
REV. 601 (1975). The canons of treaty construction were endorsed by both the majority and
the dissent in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200, 218 (1999).
183. See COHEN, supra note 4, § 2.02[2].
184. 198 U.S. at 380–81.
185. Winans, 98 U.S. at 373.
186. United States v. Taylor, 13 P. 333, 335 (Wash. Terr. 1887).
187. Id. at 335.
188. Id.
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rejected Taylor’s constricted reading of the treaty right’s scope, and
instead opted for a workable middle ground: the Indians retained a
historic right to fish, but not an ever-expanding one. The issue of the
scope of the right would continue to be litigated for decades.189
Concerning the issue of the implicit abrogation of the treaty by
the Homestead Act, Justice Hoyt dismissed Taylor’s logic. The court
construed the Homestead Act as “only authoriz[ing] the extinguishment
of the title which the government holds at the time of the appropriation,
and if the land selected by the settler has at such time any servitude or
easement impressed upon it, he takes subject thereto.”190 Homesteaders
like Taylor therefore took only that title which the government held at
the time of the issuance of their or their predecessor’s land patent. And,
according to Justice Hoyt, Taylor’s title was burdened with implied
easements for Indian fishing, stemming from “ancient” fishing practices
that had been used “for generations,” and recognized in the treaties.191
This principle would be adopted by the Supreme Court in its Winans
decision.
C. The Ineffective Decree and the Agents’ Fights to Remedy It
Having reversed the district court’s decision, the Washington
Territorial Supreme Court then remanded the issue to District Judge
Turner, directing the lower court to enter a decree recognizing the
fishing right and an easement to support it.192 But Turner’s ensuing
decree, issued nine months after the territorial court’s opinion, narrowly
interpreted Justice Hoyt’s ruling.193 Although the decree recognized the
native right to fish and the access easement accompanying it, Judge
Turner cabined both the Indian fishing season and the physical attributes
of the easement. Justice Hoyt’s opinion had neither mentioned a fishing
season nor limited the scope of the easement, but Turner’s decree
confined Indian fishing to the summer months and burdened only ten

189. See, e.g., Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919) (treaty fishing right
extends to accessing historic fishing places not expressly ceded by treaty language); Tulee
v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (treaty fishing right includes insulation from state
licensing fees); Dep’t of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (treaty fishing
right includes insulation from discriminatory state regulation); Washington v. Wash. State
Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (treaty fishing right includes an
equal share of the harvest).
190. Taylor, 13 P. at 336.
191. Id. at 335–36.
192. Id.
193. The Supreme Court decision was handed down in January 1887; the Turner decree
was issued in October 1887. See Gordon Letter, supra note 117, at 34–62 (discussing the
decree).
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acres of Taylor’s 794-acre parcel with the easement for passage,
structures, pasturing, and fish curing.194
Special Indian Agent George W. Gordon, who had been sent by
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to survey and report on the
conditions at Indian fisheries, was astonished by the restrictive Turner
decree, observing that it provided “not pasturage enough to keep one
animal.”195 He reported that the decree’s terms regarding what
constituted a “temporary structure” were vague and did not clearly
indicate whether such structures were to stand during the off-season.196
Over the next few months, Gordon unsuccessfully campaigned to the
lawyers for both parties and to the court to modify and clarify the
decree.197 He arranged a meeting with U.S. attorneys Allen and White at
the Tumwater site in December of 1887, but they failed to show.198
Gordon was then informed by natives at the site that Taylor had taken
some of their houses for his own use after ejecting the Indians.199
Despite promises by White to seek court modification of the
decree, the attorneys assigned to protect the tribes’ rights failed to take
action.200 Gordon predicted that there would be serious trouble
implementing Turner’s October 1887 decree during the 1888 fishing
season absent a federal agent at the site.201 In 1889, Yakama agent
Thomas Lang urged U.S. attorney White to sue O.D. Taylor for
contempt, astutely commenting that whites intended to “weary the
Indians out of all rights they have in the fisheries; and…have annoyed
and molested their free enjoyment of their treaty rights under the

194. Id. at 34 (total acreage of Taylor’s land), 45 (discussing the scope of the easement in
the decree).
195. See id. at 38.
196. Id. at 45–46.
197. See id. at 44–62.
198. Id. at 46–47.
199. Id. at 47.
200. In March 1888, Gordon queried O.D. Taylor and W.P. Mays, whose interpretations
of the decree validated Gordon’s concerns that the order effectively undermined the
Territorial Supreme Court’s Taylor decision. In April 1888, Gordon again approached Allen
and White but, finding no purchase for his concerns, turned to Judge Turner, the decree’s
author. Turner had just retired into private practice (founding the law firm now named
Witherspoon, Kelley, Davenport & Toole, the largest real estate law firm in the Inland
Northwest). Turner warned O.D. Taylor that he would be held in contempt of court if he
tore down temporary fishing structures or if he failed to give the decree a “liberal
construction.” Gordon relayed Judge Turner’s warning to Taylor, who agreed to not harass
the Indians but nevertheless maintained a narrower interpretation of the decree than did
Gordon. See id. at 48–60.
201. Id. at 61–64.
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decree.”202 As the agents feared, the federal guardianship protecting
Indian fishing rights proved to be inadequate in practice, setting the
stage for another legal battle a few years later, this time between native
fishermen and the Winans brothers, Taylor’s successors.
VI. UNITED STATES V. WINANS: THE EPIC CASE
The Winans case took nearly nine years to work through the
The Supreme Court decision came as a surprise because it
seemed to run contrary to assimilation policy at the time. But when
viewed in light of local history and the equities and realities of allotment
policies and their effect on the reservations, the Supreme Court’s
decision is understandable. Although the record contains no declarations
of their motivations, it seems likely that U.S. Attorney Brinker pursued
the case for the same reasons that agents Milroy and Gordon had fought
for tribal fishing rights. Reservations had failed in their agrarian goals,
and treaty fishing rights were rapidly eroding. As reservations
diminished due to allotment, it became especially important to preserve
Indian access to fish, a main source of food, ritual, and commerce.
courts.203

A. Background: The Winans Brothers Step into Taylor’s Shoes
Audubon and Linnaens204 Winans settled on the Columbia
Plateau in 1887, purchasing large tracts in Oregon on the east side of
Hood River.205 In 1895, they erected a large fishwheel across the river in
Washington on land adjacent to the Tumwater fishery previously owned
by O.D. Taylor, the same contentious site at issue in the Taylor and Spedis
202. Report on Tumwater Fisheries, in REPORTS OF AGENTS IN WASHINGTON TO THE
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR FOR THE YEAR 1889, at 295–96 (Aug. 15, 1889), available at http:
//content.lib.washington.edu/cgibin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lctext&CISOPTR=964.
203. Although the United States filed suit against the Winans brothers in mid-1895,
Judge Hanford did not issue a final opinion until 1903. This delay may have been due to a
variety of factors, including the relative lack of proactive measures taken by Indian agents
after 1898 (Agent Erwyn’s replacement, Jay Lynch, failed even to mention Indian fishing in
his reports; see infra Part VI.C), but the delay was probably due to Judge Hanford’s
equivocations about injunctive relief, as explained infra Part VI.B. Ultimately, his final
order in 1903 simply repeated his 1896 opinion but lifted the injunction that had been
imposed for eight years. See infra Part VI.C.
204. The spelling of the first names of both defendants in the case varies throughout the
record; the spellings used in this article are those the Winans brothers used when signing
court documents. Residents for some time referred to the area as the “Winans Addition.”
See DELIA M. COON, HISTORY OF EARLY PIONEER FAMILIES OF HOOD RIVER, OREGON 287
(1944), available at http://freepages.genealogy.rootsweb.com/~bryajw/HoodRiverPio
neers; see also Will Have an Election on the Library Proposition, HOOD RIVER NEWS, Mar. 12,
1913, at 1, available at http://homepages.rootsweb.com/~westklic/hrcl1913.html.
205. COON, supra note 204, at 287.
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cases.206 The Winans brothers were upstanding participants in the
building of Hood River, Oregon, and its commerce, but they were feared
by Indians.207 Like Frank Taylor, the Winans brothers hired an Indian,
Charlie Dick, to keep the other Indians out of the fishery.208 Tribal people
did not trust the white fishermen or their courts,209 and the Winans
brothers allegedly used “force, intimidation,…threats[,]…and assault”
and “tore down and destroyed [the Indians’] temporary houses.”210
On July 11, 1895, U.S. Attorney William H. Brinker filed a
complaint in Washington district court alleging that the Winans brothers
had violated the Yakima Treaty by obstructing tribal access to the
Tumwater fishery and outlining a variety of intimidation tactics and
assaults.211 The same day that Brinker filed the complaint, Justice
Cornelius H. Hanford212 issued a temporary injunction directing the
Winans to “desist and refrain from in any manner obstructing,
interfering with, or preventing…[the Indians] from fishing” at
Tumwater, and to “desist from constructing, operating, or maintaining
fish wheels” anywhere that might interfere with Indian fishing.213

206. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 162 (testimony of Frank P. Taylor). Taylor
sold the land to Tyler Woodward of Portland, who entered into a purchase contract with
the Winans brothers. See Respondent’s Brief at 9, United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371
(1905); Federal Brief at 33–37, Winans, 198 U.S. 371.
207. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 86 (testimony of Charley Cath-lum-it); id. at
89 (testimony of Bill Se-hi-am).
208. Id. at 55–56 (testimony of Charley Dick); id. at 67–68 (testimony of Winneer); id. at
79 (testimony of Sam Tan-a-washa).
209. After Milroy’s dismissal in 1884, subsequent Yakama agents curtailed their
involvement in resolving disputes over tribal fishing. The Winans brothers threatened
Indians with white courts, saying that, if they trespassed, they would “have them in
Goldendale” (the nearest county jail). Id. at 56, 70 (testimony of Charley Dick); id. at 68
(testimony of Winneer); id. at 83 (testimony of Joe Ko-lock-en); id. at 86 (testimony of
Charley Cath-lum-it); id. at 91 (testimony of Bill Charley); id. at 100 (testimony of William
Speedies); id. at 105 (testimony of Charley Winnear).
210. See id. at 66 (describing an assault by one of Winans’ men).
211. The complaint was originally filed against “John Doe and Richard Roe
Winans,…whose true names are unknown.” Federal Complaint filed July 11, 1895,
Transcript of Record, at 1–3, Winans, 198 U.S. 371.
212. Five years earlier, Judge Hanford had upheld Justice Hoyt’s 1887 Taylor decision by
rejecting O.D. Taylor’s claim that Washington’s statehood in 1889 should result in recission
of old territorial-era rules like treaty fishing rights. United States v. Taylor, 44 F. 2, 3 (D.
Wash. S.D. 1890).
213. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 14–15 (Order of July 11, 1895). Judge
Hanford modified the injunction in November 1896 in response to a stipulated agreement
between the government and the Winans brothers specifying the fishing sites to which the
Indians would have “free egress and ingress” and also where they could erect temporary
houses and pasture horses, as called for in the treaty. Id. at 20 (Order of Nov. 19, 1895).

36

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

B. The District Court Decisions
In the fall of 1895, the Winans brothers, represented by Hill and
Mays (as Taylor had been), responded to Brinker’s complaint by
maintaining that the court lacked jurisdiction and asserting that no relief
was appropriate.214 In March 1896, Judge Hanford overruled their
demurrer, but his opinion included an interpretation of article III of the
treaty that did not bode well for the Indians. He distinguished the
Indians’ exclusive on-reservation rights from their off-reservation “in
common with” rights, stating that “[i]t would not be a fair construction
of the treaty” that areas outside the reservation should be “set apart and
surveyed for the exclusive use of the Indians…as places for temporary
buildings, or for the pasturage of horses or cattle.”215 Judge Hanford
interpreted the treaty language “in common with the citizens of the
territory”216 as either reserving for or granting to217 the Indians (1)
exclusive rights to fish on their reservations and (2) “in common with”
rights—that is, equal to those of white citizens—to fish off their
reservations.218 But Hanford claimed that the equality implicit in the “in
common with” language implied the absence of other rights.219
Judge Hanford’s interpretation of the nature of the Indian offreservation treaty rights led him to conclude that these rights did not
survive the government’s issuance of homestead patents to the Winans’
predecessors.220 Thus, the tribes could not erect temporary structures or
214. Id. at 18 (Defendants’ Demurrer). The Winans alleged that the court lacked
jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not exceed $2,000. Id. at 24.
215. United States v. Winans, 73 F. 72, 74 (D. Wash. S.D. 1896).
216. Id. (recognizing “the right of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in
common with citizens of the Territory”) (citing Treaty between the United States & the
Yakama Nation of Indians, 12 Stat. 951, 953 (1855)).
217. The court stated, “It is plain that the treaty, whether considered as a grant from the
United States government to the Indians or as a reservation by the Indians, secures to the
Indians rights of two kinds….” Winans, 73 F. at 74. The Supreme Court decision in Winans
would resolve this issue in favor of reserved rights. See infra notes 274–279 and
accompanying text.
218. Winans, 73 F. at 74 (“The language of the treaty indicates that the purpose was to
secure to the Indians equality of rights with citizens in the matter of fishing, hunting,
gathering roots and berries, and pasturing horses and cattle, and in the use and occupation
of unclaimed land for the erection of temporary buildings….”).
219. Id. (“[T]he enumeration of other rights secured to the Indians by express words
negatives any possible presumption of rights by mere implication.…”). Four years earlier,
Judge Hanford had concluded that a similar “in common with” treaty fishing promise gave
the Makah Tribe “only an equality of rights and privileges in the matter of fishing, whaling,
and sealing.” United States v. The James G. Swan, 50 F. 108, 111 (N.D. Wash. 1892).
220. See Winans, 73 F. at 74 (“The theory that lands conveyed by government patents,
after being so conveyed, and appropriated by individual citizens, still remain subservient
to use and occupation by the Indians, for travel over the same, otherwise than by lawfully
established public highways, and for camping grounds, finds no support in the provisions
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pasture horses on the Winans’ land,221 and the judge specifically refused
to order the Winans to “permit the Indians to make a camping ground of
their property while engaged in fishing.”222 Yet he concluded that
excluding the Indians from the Tumwater fishery due to the Winans’
fishwheels was “plainly an invasion of the rights of the Indians under
the treaty.”223 Judge Hanford therefore maintained the injunction
preventing the Winans brothers from blocking Indian access to
Tumwater while concluding that the reserved treaty right to erect
temporary shelters did not survive on private property.224 The confusing
distinction Judge Hanford drew between access and temporary shelters
might have been due to the fact that he viewed the Winans brothers’
fishwheels as claiming a monopoly of the Tumwater fishery, or due to
his view that the Winans’ fee simple title was incompatible with
temporary Indian shelters, or perhaps both. But the distinction was
clearly not based on the text of the treaty.225
Four months later, in July, in response to requests to modify the
injunction, Judge Hanford issued another order to the Winans brothers
reiterating his directive not to interfere with Indian access to the
Tumwater fishery, including operating fishwheels that obstructed Indian
fishing and from “obstructing any road or highway.”226 But curiously,
of the treaty….”). The court noted that it “might be a good argument” to maintain that the
government should not have issued the homestead patents, but having done so, it was
“now too late” to protect the treaty rights short of purchasing the lands in question from
the Winans brothers. Id. at 75.
221. Id. at 75 (“[T]he right of the Indians to erect temporary buildings on any particular
spot of ground, according to the terms of the treaty, as I construe it, ceased when the title to
that land was transferred from the government, and became vested as private property.”).
222. Id. The language of article III of the Treaty with the Yakamas reads, “[T]he right of
taking fish at all usual and accustomed places, in common with citizens of the Territory,
and of erecting temporary buildings for curing them; together with the privilege of
hunting, gathering roots and berries, and pasturing their horses and cattle upon open and
unclaimed land.” Treaty between the United States & the Yakama Nation of Indians, 12
Stat. 951, 953 (1855). Hunting, gathering, and pasturage rights, since they were limited to
“open and unclaimed land,” could be reasonably construed not to apply to private lands.
See, e.g., State v. Buchanan, 978 P.2d 1070, 1081–82 (Wash. 1999) (citing federal and state
cases supporting the proposition that publicly owned lands are open and unclaimed). See
also ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 148, at 507–08 (discussing the case law). However, the
right of erecting temporary buildings was not limited to “open and unclaimed lands,”
instead, extending to all “usual and accustomed places.” In short, its scope is coextensive
with the “right of taking fish,” making Judge Hanford’s attempt to distinguish the scope of
the access right from the right to erect temporary buildings completely atextual.
223. Winans, 73 F. at 75 (internal punctuation omitted).
224. Id. (“[T]he bill states facts sufficient to require the court to enjoin the defendants
from interfering with the Indians in the enjoyment of their common right of fishery.…”).
225. See Treaty between the United States & the Yakama Nation of Indians, supra note
222.
226. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 65–66 (Order of July 11, 1896).
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given his March opinion distinguishing the Indians’ access rights from
their “campground” rights, Judge Hanford expanded the injunction to
prohibit the Winans from “interfering with the temporary houses…on
the lands adjacent” to the fishing places.227 He made no attempt to
explain how this result was consistent with his earlier March opinion.
To further complicate matters, in September 1896, just two
months later, when Brinker, the U.S. Attorney, sought to enforce the
modified injunction, Judge Hanford was not sympathetic. He refused to
hold the Winans brothers in contempt for fencing their property to block
trails that the Indians customarily used to reach the river. Instead, he
ruled that, since the fence did not obstruct any road connecting the
highway to the river, it did not offend the injunction.228 Apparently, so
long as one means of access to the river was available, there was no
treaty violation.
Then, in November 1896, in response to another Brinker motion,
Judge Hanford referred the case to a special master, S.C. Henton, to take
testimony from both Indians and whites on the nature of the
obstructions inhibiting Indian fishing.229 At a May 1897 hearing,
numerous witnesses testified before Henton. Displaced Indian fishermen
detailed their personal histories at the fishery, each with a distinct
perspective on the changes that had occurred over the previous quartercentury. Like the paths that wound down to the fishery, the life story of
each testifying Indian was interrupted by barbed wire, threats of bodily
harm, fear of being taken to jail, and the specter of an end to lifelong
rituals and livelihoods. Former courtroom adversaries Thomas
Simpson230 and William Speedies231 also testified for the government, as
did several whites, including a steamboat captain,232 a settler who had
resided adjacent to the Tumwater fishery since 1850,233 and a Methodist
minister who had lived among the Indians since 1860.234 These witnesses
explained a way of life whose existence was threatened by white
encroachment. The Indian witnesses gave their understanding of the
227. Id. at 66.
228. Id. at 68–70 (Order of Sept. 10, 1896). This reasoning echoed the trial court decision
in Taylor, which narrowly construed the scope of the Indians’ access rights. See supra note
167 and accompanying text. But that decision was reversed by the Washington Territorial
Court, which prohibited the blocking of “any servitude or easement impressed” on the
lands, apparently embracing all traditional means of access. United States v. Taylor, 13 P.
333, 335 (Wash. Terr. 1887). For more information on the Territorial Supreme Court
decision, see supra notes 177–178, 186–191 and accompanying text.
229. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 71 (Order of Nov. 12, 1896).
230. Id. at 86–96 (testimony of Thomas Simpson).
231. Id. at 176–81 (testimony of William Speedies).
232. Id. at 214–28 (testimony of Captain M. Martineau).
233. Id. at 228–40 (testimony of J.H. Covington).
234. Id. at 203–14 (testimony of J.H. Wood).
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nature of their fishing right, and how they thought their fishing was
protected by the treaty. Some Indians remembered firsthand the signing
of the treaty, which they thought promised that “as long as this world
stays here [the Indians] will have all the salmon [they] want in [the
Columbia] all the time.”235
C. Inertia Sets In, Agents Disengage: 1897 to 1903
For the next six years, from 1897 to 1903, the conflict festered. In
October 1897, Henton submitted the testimony to Judge Hanford, but the
judge took no action until 1902. L.T. Erwin, the Yakama agent in 1897,
complained in his annual report that the “delay is working a very great
hardship” on the Indians, and that in the meantime “white men are
fencing up all the fisheries…thus depriving [the Indians of their]…
considerations of the treaty.”236 That year agent Erwin was replaced by
Jay Lynch, who thereafter failed to so much as mention Indian fishing in
his annual reports until after the Supreme Court’s Winans decision.237
Finally, after considering the testimony and holding another
hearing in May 1902, the court decided to dismiss the case and dissolve
the injunction on February 23, 1903,238 nearly eight years after the
government initiated the suit. In this decision, Judge Hanford finally
abandoned, without explanation, the distinction he tried to draw earlier
between access rights and rights to build shelters.239 He simply referred
back to his 1896 ruling, declining to rehash what “ha[d] been heretofore
said” nearly seven years earlier, and merely restated that the treaty only
put the Indians “on an equal footing with the citizens of the United
States who have not acquired exclusive proprietary rights.”240 Holders of
235. Id. at 98 (testimony of White Swan). See also id. at 112–17 (testimony of Moses
Strong); id. at 86–96 (testimony of Thomas Simpson).
236. Report of Yakima Agency, in REPORTS OF AGENTS IN WASHINGTON 297, 298 (Aug. 31,
1897), available at http://content.lib.washington.edu/cgi-bin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=
/lctext&CISOPTR=1160.
237. See Report of Superintendent in Charge of Yakima Agency, in REPORTS CONCERNING
INDIANS IN WASHINGTON 386, 387 (Aug. 22, 1906), available at http://content.
lib.washington.edu/cgi-bin/docviewer.exe?CISOROOT=/lctext&CISOPTR=1413. Lynch’s
reports are all viewable from the University of Washington Library’s Digital Collection, at
http://content.lib.washington.edu/index.html.
238. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 73–74 (Mem. Decision on the Merits, Feb.
23, 1903). The case was formally dismissed on May 28, 1903. Id. at 75–76.
239. See supra notes 220–228 and accompanying text.
240. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 73–74 (Mem. Decision on the Merits, Feb.
23, 1903). Between his 1896 decision and his 1903 dismissal, Judge Hanford had rejected a
claim quite similar to that involved in the Winans case concerning Lummi Tribe fishing on
Fraser River sockeye runs adjacent to Point Roberts near the border between the United
States and British Columbia. The federal government alleged that tribal fishermen were
excluded from their traditional fishing sites by a series of fish traps operated by the Alaska
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homestead patents like the Winans brothers could therefore exclude
tribal fishermen from the fishing sites because they could exclude whites
as well. On November 16, 1903, the government appealed Judge
Hanford’s decision to the Supreme Court.241
C. The Supreme Court Decision
The Winans case arrived at the Supreme Court on direct appeal
on January 30, 1904. Arguing the case for the government was Solicitor
General Henry M. Hoyt.242 Charles Carey argued for the Winans
brothers, with Franklin Mays on the brief.
1. The Government’s Argument
Solicitor Hoyt began his argument by observing that the Celilo
Falls fishery “is and always has been a famous one…[probably] the best
place on the Columbia River.”243 The government acknowledged that the
tribes “objected to the transfer of their lands until assured by the
Government as to the[ir] fishery rights.”244 According to Hoyt, the tribes
did not claim exclusive fishery rights, only “rights in common with

Packers Association for their nearby cannery. But Judge Hanford concluded that there was
no violation of the Treaty of Point Elliot’s promised “right of taking fish” because the treaty
“secure[d] to the Indians equality of rights, co-equal with the rights of citizens, and not
exclusive rights at any particular places.” United States v. Alaska Packers’ Ass’n, 79 F. 152,
155 (N.D. Wash. 1897). Judge Hanford specifically rejected the idea that the treaty
recognized any proprietary rights, like easements, and erroneously concluded that the
federal government had possessed fee title to lands in Indian possession prior to the treaty.
Id. at 156; contra infra note 256. Judge Hanford cited both this decision and his 1892 decision
in The James G. Swan, supra note 219, in dismissing the Winans case. Transcript of Record,
supra note 133, at 73–74 (Mem. Decision on the Merits, Feb. 23, 1903).
241. Transcript of Record, supra note 133, at 411 (Assignment of Errors, Nov. 16, 1903).
The Evarts Act of 1891 authorized direct appeals to the Supreme Court from district courts
in cases involving the validity or construction of treaties. Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat.
826, 827–28 (1891).
242. Hoyt, who was not related to the judge who wrote the Taylor opinion, supra notes
178–191 and accompanying text, was the son of a Pennsylvania governor and a Theodore
Roosevelt appointee. He served as Solicitor General from 1903 to 1909. After a successful
decade in finance, he found a use for his Yale law degree by turning to politics. Shortly
after arguing Winans, Hoyt was instrumental in restoring many Indians onto the recently
gutted Dawes Roll, thus protecting their property rights. See Garfield v. United States ex rel.
Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249 (1908) (requiring the Secretary of the Interior to restore named Indian
allottees to approved rolls of citizenship in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations). Hoyt’s
motion in the Garfield case is reproduced at http://www.genealogy4all.org/4Mar
1907.html.
243. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 371 (1905) (internal punctuation omitted).
244. Id. at 372.
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citizens.”245 Moreover, he maintained that “[t]he Government has always
striven against disparity between our promises when obtaining treaties
and the actual meaning of the instrument.”246 Hoyt asserted that “the
spirit” of Indian treaties, plus the fact that the Winans brothers were
clearly on notice (via actual knowledge) of the tribal claims, made their
land patents conditional, not absolute, because “Congress…never
divested the Indians of the [fishery] right,” even though it had not made
any land patents expressly conditional, since a grant of a patent “without
proper reservations” could not “divest valid vested rights.”247
The government also noted that fishwheels, such as those
operated by the Winans brothers, were “very destructive,” harvesting
“salmon by the ton…not only rapidly diminishing the supply but…soon
totally destroy[ing] it.”248 This de facto claim of an exclusive right was
inconsistent with both English and American law, which disfavored
exclusive rights to fisheries.249 Further, Solicitor Hoyt contended that the
Taylor decision by the Washington Territorial Court had already resolved
the question of tribal rights. According to Hoyt, the Indian servitude to
cross riparian lands to access their historic fisheries was not “a broad and
vague” one but “a clear and limited one,” and the government
recognized this right “long before the private grants by patent were
made.”250 The government had the authority to recognize such prestatehood rights “when the Federal power was in full control, during the
territorial status.”251 The tribal right was therefore “not merely
meritorious and equitable; it [was] an immemorial right like a ripened
prescription.”252 Thus, Hoyt maintained that the subsequent homestead

245. Id. But, according to the government, the tribes “cannot cross the lands [owned by
the Winans] to reach the fishery and are without any right whatever except what the
defendants allow as a matter of grace.” Id.
246. Id. (emphasizing that the treaty was “not merely one of peace and amity…but a
treaty of cession of lands…on considerations duly expressed, one of which was the fishery
rights now contended for”).
247. Id. at 372–73.
248. Id. at 372.
249. Id. at 373 (citing British and American cases as well as secondary sources
supporting this proposition).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 374 (citing, inter alia, Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (holding that the
federal government can create private rights in submerged lands prior to statehood,
despite the “equal footing” doctrine under which the states succeed to the title of
submerged lands after statehood)). The Supreme Court would later extend this reasoning
to uphold federally created property rights after statehood. See Arizona v. California, 373
U.S. 546, 597–98 (1963) (recognizing federal reserved water rights created by executive
order subsequent to statehood).
252. Winans, 198 U.S. at 374 (citing Barker v. Harvey, 181 U.S. 481 (1901)
(distinguishing)).
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patents the government issued did not “invariably and inevitably convey
an absolute title beyond all inquiry and free of every condition.”253
The government closed its argument by suggesting that a
decision upholding the tribal right would respect “the reasonable rights
of both parties; restricting the fish wheels, if they can be maintained at
all, as to their number, method and daily hours of operation.”254 Yet
judicial recognition would not create an “exclusive right” in the Indians,
as it would “be just to restrict them in reasonable ways as to times and
modes of access to the property and their hours for fishing. But by some
proper route, following the old trails, and at proper hours, with due
protection for [the Winans brothers’] buildings, stock and crops, free
ingress to and egress from the fishing grounds should be open to the
Indians, and be kept open.”255
2. The Winans Brothers’ Argument
The Winans brothers’ attorney, Charles H. Carey, responded by
mischaracterizing the federal interest in the pre-treaty, pre-statehood
Oregon territory as “invested with the fee of all the lands and waters
included therein.”256 Carey erroneously contended that Indian title was
“merely a right to perpetual occupancy of the land,” although he
accurately acknowledged that it was the tribes’ decision to surrender
their rights, however characterized.257 But he also mistakenly claimed
that tribal “title to the reservations was of no higher character” than
Indian title.258
According to Carey, the tribe “neither reserved nor did they
acquire a title by occupancy to the lands bordering their usual and
customary fishing grounds.” They had instead only a temporary right
“to fish, hunt, and build temporary houses upon public lands, in
common with white citizens….”259 Carey maintained that the Yakama’s
treaty “imposed no restraint upon the power of the United States to sell
the lands in controversy,…and it cannot be assumed that the
253. Id. See also, e.g., Eldridge v. Tresevant, 160 U.S. 452 (1896).
254. Id. at 375.
255. Id.
256. Id. See also Blumm, supra note 55, at 728–30, 740–41 (arguing that the discovery
doctrine has been mischaracterized as leaving the natives with merely occupancy title,
when in fact they possessed the fee, and the government had only an exclusive right of
purchase, or a right of preemption). A more accurate description of the state of title in the
pre-treaty Oregon Territory would characterize the federal property interest as a right of
preemption, with the Indians holding the fee simple. Id.
257. Winans, 198 U.S. at 375.
258. Id. But cf. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (holding that
reservation title is protected by the Fifth Amendment’s compensation clause).
259. Winans, 198 U.S. at 375–76.
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Government intended by general expressions in the treaty to tie up the
development of the fishing industry through a long stretch of the waters
of the Columbia.”260 The gravamen of Carey’s case was that, because the
Winans brothers could exclude whites from their patented lands, “Indian
rights[,] being of no higher nature[,] were likewise revoked and
extinguished.”261
Carey claimed that Washington statehood, through the equal
footing doctrine,262 gave title to “the shore and lands under water,”263
which was another exaggeration, since the scope of lands implicitly
conveyed by the federal government at statehood is limited to lands
submerged beneath navigable waters and does not include shorelands.264
Carey also argued that the express intention of the U.S. and the Yakama
Nation representatives at the treaty council was “incompetent and
inadmissible” if it would “tend to vary the plain stipulations of the
treaty.”265 According to Carey, the treaty language “in common”
signified that
both whites and Indians could use such implements and
methods of fishing and hunting in the exercise of their
common rights as they saw fit, and the use of fish wheels
by the whites in the customary runways of the fish which
did not exclude the Indians from fishing elsewhere, would
not deprive the Indians of their common right.266
This interpretation of the treaty language would be decisively rejected by
the Supreme Court.
3. The Court’s Opinion
The Court decided 8-1 in favor of the government, with Justice
White dissenting without expressing an opinion. The Court’s opinion
was written by Justice Joseph McKenna, who accurately focused on the
pertinent treaty language, stating “the right of taking fish in common

260. Id. at 376.
261. Id. This was the argument that carried the day in the lower court. See also supra
notes 218–222 and accompanying text.
262. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 30.01(a), (b)(2).
263. Winans, 198 U.S. at 376 (“The title to the shore and land under water is incidental to
the sovereignty of a State…and held in trust for the public purposes of navigation and
fishery….Control and regulation shall be exercised subject only to the paramount authority
of Congress with regard to public navigation and commerce.”).
264. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596–97 (1963).
265. Defendant/Respondent’s Brief at 36, Winans, 198 U.S. 371.
266. Id.
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with the citizens of the Territory.”267 The district court had interpreted
this provision to place the Indians outside their reservation only on an
“equal footing” with white citizens without proprietary rights.268 But
Justice McKenna observed that this interpretation left the tribal fishers
with essentially no treaty rights outside their reservation.269 He found
this to be inadequate in memorable words: “This is certainly an impotent
outcome to negotiations and a convention, which seem to promise more
and give the word of the Nation for more.”270
Justice McKenna also faulted the lower court for failing to
interpret the treaty in light of Indian intentions and Indian
understandings, and for failing to recognize the fundamentally
inequitable nature of the bargaining that produced the treaty language:
[W]e have said that we will construe a treaty with the
Indians as “that unlettered people” understood it, and “as
justice and reason demand in all cases where power is
exerted by the strong over those to whom they owe care
and protection,” and counterpoise the inequality “by the
superior justice which looks only to the substance of the
right without regard to technical rules.”271
The Court explained the circumstances under which the treaties
were negotiated in almost poetic terms: “The right to resort to the fishing
places in controversy was a part of larger rights possessed by the
Indians, upon the exercise of which there was not a shadow of
impediment, and which were not much less necessary to the existence of
the Indians than the atmosphere that they breathed.”272 Recognition that
267. Id. at 379 (“The pivot of the controversy is the construction of [the treaty language
quoted above].”). Justice McKenna was a William McKinley appointee, taking his seat on
the Court in 1898 and serving until 1925. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME
COURT 539 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). He was, according to one account, the “living
embodiment of the Horatio Alger myth, rising from poverty to a seat on the U.S. Supreme
Court.” Id. at 539. A four-term Republican congressman from California, he was appointed
to the Ninth Circuit in 1892 by Benjamin Harrison on the recommendation of California
Senator Leland Stanford. Five years later, President McKinley nominated him to fill the seat
vacated by another Californian, Stephen J. Field. Justice McKenna’s opinions “were marked
by grace and aptness of phrase.” Id. at 539. Although he did not write many majority
opinions, “his opinions reveal a strong nationalism, practicality, and sound social judgment
with relation to developing federal power and its impact on the states.” Id. at 540.
268. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text.
269. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380 (“[I]t was decided that the Indians acquired no rights
but what any inhabitant of the Territory or State would have. Indeed, acquired no rights
but such as they would have without the treaty.”).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 380–81 (citing Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1, 30 (1886); Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 44 (1899)).
272. Id. at 381.
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the tribes gave up so much land in the treaties weighed heavily in the
Court’s interpretation. In light of how much they lost, Justice McKenna
concluded that what the tribes expressly retained in the treaty were
permanent rights, which could perhaps be limited as a result of changed
conditions but not lost.273
The nature of the tribal treaty rights was greatly influenced by
the Court’s critically important recognition that “the treaty was not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them—a
reservation of those not granted.”274 This observation established the
reserved rights doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence.275 The Court
explained that due to the nature of the treaty negotiations—with tribes,
not with individuals, and involving large tracts of land—the result could
not be recorded in individual deeds.276 Yet the expressly reserved “right
of taking fish” created an enforceable “right in the land” that burdened
subsequent land grants.277 In short, the treaty created “a servitude upon
every piece of land as though described therein.”278 This servitude “was
intended to be continuing against the United States and its grantees as
well as against the State and its grantees.”279
Carey, counsel for the Winans brothers, emphasized that the
treaty-created servitude was a non-exclusive, “in common” right. He
claimed that as part of the state’s authority to regulate fishing, it could
license fishwheels because “wheel fishing is one of the civilized man’s
methods, as legitimate as the substitution of the modern combined
harvester for the ancient sickle and flail.”280 Justice McKenna
acknowledged that “[i]n the actual taking of fish white men may not be
confined to a spear or crude net,” but he nevertheless ruled that “it does
not follow that they may construct and use a device which gives them
exclusive possession of the fishing places, as it is admitted a fish wheel
does.”281 The Winans brothers’ attempt at monopoly, with an assist from
273. Id. (“New conditions came into existence, to which those rights had to be
accommodated. Only a limitation of them, however, was necessary and intended, not a
taking away.”).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 37.01(b)(1).
276. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381 (“The reservations were in large areas of territory and the
negotiations were with the tribe. They reserved rights, however, to every individual Indian,
as though named therein.”).
277. Id. (“The contingency of the future ownership of the lands, therefore, was foreseen
and provided for—in other words, the Indians were given a right in the land—the right of
crossing it to the river—the right to occupy it to the extent and for the purpose mentioned.
No other conclusion would give effect to the treaty.”).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 381–82.
280. Id. at 382.
281. Id.

46

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 46

the state’s license, coupled with the claim that the Indian harvest was an
inferior technology, did not move the Court, which observed that “[i]f
the Indians had not been inferior in capacity and power, what the treaty
would have been, or that there would have been any treaty, would be
hard to guess.”282 The Court’s determination to interpret the treaty in
favor of the weaker party made the Winans brothers’ claimed monopoly
especially unlikely.
Nor was the Court concerned that the Winans brothers’ patent
contained no mention of the tribal servitude. The Court concluded that
the federal land department lacked the authority to grant exemptions to
the treaty promises. It “ma[de] no difference, therefore, that the patents
issued by the Department are absolute in form[, since t]hey are subject to
the treaty as to the other laws of the land.”283
Finally, Carey argued for the Winans brothers that the admission
of Washington into the Union in 1889, “upon an equal footing with the
original States,” eliminated the ability of the federal government “to
grant nor retain rights in the shore or to the lands under water,” since
that authority was implicitly conveyed to the state in the statehood act.284
The Court quickly disposed of this argument, relying on Shively v.
Bowlby, an 1894 decision in which the Court indicated that the federal
government had the authority to grant territorial submerged lands prior
to statehood for proper public purposes.285 Justice McKenna made clear
that extinguishing Indian title, thereby opening land for settlement and
paving the way for statehood, was a proper purpose.286 However, he
went on to suggest that the state could regulate the exercise of the right:
“Nor does it restrain the State unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of
the right. It only fixes in the land such easements as enables the right to
be exercised.”287 This authorization of state regulation, subject only to a

282. Id. The Court stated that the state’s license for the fish wheel lacked authority to,
and was not intended to “exclude the Indians.…What rights the Indians had were not
determined or limited.” Id. at 384. Instead, any limitations would come from the courts, not
the state. See infra note 289 and accompanying text.
283. Id. at 382.
284. Id. at 382–83. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 30.01(b)(2)
(discussing the “equal footing” doctrine, under which states implicitly obtain title to lands
submerged beneath navigable waters within their jurisdiction as a consequence of
statehood).
285. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48 (1894) (ruling that the federal government may
grant submerged lands under navigable waters prior to statehood in order to fulfill
international obligations, to improve commerce, or for other public purposes).
286. Winans, 198 U.S. at 384 (“And surely it was within the competency of the Nation to
secure to the Indians such a remnant of the great rights they possessed as ‘taking fish at all
usual and accustomed places.’”).
287. Id.
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vague reasonableness standard, would produce a glut of ensuing
litigation.288
Despite this apparently broad authorization of state regulation,
the Court was unwilling to let the state determine the nature of the tribal
rights, stating that this chore “was a matter for judicial determination.”289
There would be numerous opportunities over the next century for the
courts to fulfill the role envisioned by the Winans Court to articulate the
nature of tribal fishing rights.
VII. THE CONTINUING SIGNIFICANCE OF THE WINANS
DECISION
Because of its poetic language,290 Winans would be worthy of
citation a century later. But the case also laid down principles that have
endured thorough the twentieth century and will do so in the twentyfirst. Some are less well appreciated than others, and some courts have
apparently forgotten or do not understand them.291 This section explains
its principal contributions to Indian law jurisprudence a century after the
fact.
A. Construing Treaty Language as Tribes Would Understand
The Winans decision was not the first case to hold that courts
must interpret Indian treaties as the tribes would understand. Chief
Justice Marshall had employed Indian understanding to interpret terms
in the Treaty of Hopewell with the Cherokee in his 1832 decision in
Worcester v. Georgia. That decision held that the laws of Georgia had no
force in Cherokee country and “[p]rotection does not imply the
destruction of the protected.”292 And just a half-dozen years prior to
Winans, the Court looked to Indian understanding in determining that
tribal laws of inheritance governed under a treaty with the Chippewa.293
The Winans decision cemented this rule of interpretation, and its use was
central to the outcome of the case.
Tribal fishers had thought that “the right of taking fish”
language in the treaty ensured their right to pursue their historic fishing
practices, although the treaty made no mention of how private property
288. See cases cited infra notes 334–344 and accompanying text.
289. Winans, 198 U.S. at 384.
290. See supra notes 270–272 and accompanying text.
291. See infra notes 327–328 and accompanying text.
292. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 518 (1832). Marshall interpreted the treaties
based on the Indians’ understanding throughout his opinion. See, e.g., id. at 552–55, 582.
293. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 11 (1899).
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or state regulation might affect those practices. The Winans Court would
not let such developments frustrate the tribal understanding, noting that
the tribes were “unlettered” and unlikely to comprehend “technical
rules.”294 Moreover, the federal government owed the tribes “care and
protection.” Therefore, the Court’s role was to “counterpoise the
inequality” in the treaty negotiations by emphasizing the context and the
substance of tribal rights while overlooking technical details.295
The Winans Court’s endorsement of the rule of interpreting
treaties according to tribal understanding was at least partially a
reflection of the Court’s recognition of the fundamental inequality of
bargaining evident in the treaty negotiations.296 In the years since the
Winans decision, the rule of interpreting treaties according to tribal
understanding has been pivotal in several landmark cases297 and was
recently endorsed by all members of the Rehnquist Court.298
B. Creating the Reserved Rights Doctrine
Aided by the rule of construing treaty language in light of tribal
understanding, the Winans Court created the reserved rights doctrine.
The Court announced that “the treaty was not a grant of rights to the
Indians, but a grant of right[s] from them,—a reservation of those not
granted.”299 This method of treaty interpretation, combined with the rule
of construing the treaty language as the Indians would have understood,
has profound consequences, since it means that treaties preserved all
proprietary rights and sovereign control not conveyed away.300
Best known in the context of water rights,301 the reserved rights
doctrine recognizes that treaties often reserved natural resources
necessary to carry out the purpose of their reservations. Reserved rights
include not only water, but also usufructuary rights like hunting, fishing,

294. See Winans, 198 U.S. at 380–81 (citations omitted).
295. Id. at 380–81 (citations omitted).
296. See COHEN, supra note 4, § 2.02[2] (also noting the relevance of the structural
sovereignty of the tribes).
297. See, e.g., United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938) (finding that the
tribe’s reservation included timber and minerals within the reservation as “constituent
elements” of the land). Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1970) (finding
that the tribe’s reservation included the bed of a navigable river).
298. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 200, 218
(1999) (rule embraced by both the majority and the dissent).
299. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
300. In 1978, the Court added that retention of some sovereign authority of tribes, like
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, would be “inconsistent with their [dependent]
status.” Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (citation omitted).
301. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, ch. 37.
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and gathering.302 Reserved rights are essentially treaty-recognized
aboriginal rights.303 As recognized aboriginal rights, they are “prior and
paramount,”304 defeating competing resource claims.
The reserved fishing rights in question in Winans were expressly
mentioned in the Yakama Tribe’s treaty. The Winans brothers had actual
notice of their continued use in the years following the treaty, as
evidenced by the numerous conflicts over the years at the Tumwater
fishery near Celilo Falls.305 But most reserved water rights are implied
from the purposes of treaties and, therefore, competing water users had
more questionable notice of the nature of these tribal claims.306 Whether
express or implied, all the reserved rights cases trace their roots to the
Winans decision.307
The Winans strand of reserved rights preserves uses that predated the treaties that protect them. For example, the “right of taking fish
at all usual and accustomed places” at issue in Winans aimed to preserve
traditional tribal fishing at historic fishing locations like Celilo Falls.
Thus, water rights associated with Winans reserved rights carry a “time
immemorial” priority date,308 and they are commonly nonconsumptive.309 Other reserved rights, designed to protect new uses (like

302. See, e.g., Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (discussing hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights).
303. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 37.02(a)(2).
304. William H. Veeder, Indian Prior and Paramount Rights to the Use of Water, 16 ROCKY
MT. MIN. L. INST. 631 (1971).
305. See supra notes 129–138, 140, 160–167, 201–202, 206–210 and accompanying text.
306. The seminal case is Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). See 4 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, §§ 37.01(b)(2), 37.02(a)(1).
307. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, §§ 37.01(b)(1), 37.02(a)(2).
308. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983); Joint Bd. of
Control of Flathead, Mission & Jocko Irrigation Dists. v. United States, 832 F.2d 1127, 1131–
32 (9th Cir. 1987).
309. See State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead
Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 764 (Mont. 1985). As explained by the Ninth Circuit, a Winans
water right for hunting and fishing “consists of the right to prevent other appropriators
from depleting the streams [sic] waters below a protected level in any area where the nonconsumptive right applies.” Adair, 723 F.2d at 1411. But Winans water rights are not
invariably non-consumptive. The test is whether they preserve pre-existing rights, rather
than create new rights (as Winters rights do). See, e.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra
note 3, § 37.02(a)(2). In United States v. Abousleman, Civ. No. 83-1041 MV-ACE, at 26 (D.
N.M. 2005), the judge in the Jemez River water rights adjudication employed Winans to
uphold governmentally recognized aboriginal diversionary water rights that were
designed to preserve treaty-time uses, referring to these consumptive water rights as
“Winans rights.”
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irrigated agriculture), have reservation priority dates and are usually
diversionary in nature.310
The scope of the rights reserved has been an enduring source of
controversy since the Winans decision. In 1978, in a non-Indian case, the
Supreme Court ruled that the scope of reserved water rights was
measured by what was necessary to fulfill the “primary purpose” of the
reservation.311 This result was not necessarily inconsistent with the
Winans decision, since Justice McKenna held that the purpose of the
Yakama Treaty was to extinguish Indian title, establish Indian
reservations, and “define rights outside of them.”312 Although the
Supreme Court has never applied the “primary purpose” test to Indian
reserved rights, lower courts have. Astonishingly, one court recently
employed that test to deny that a tribe with a treaty promising “the right
of taking fish” had proved that its reservation had a fishing purpose.313 A
decision much more faithful to the concern of the Court in Winans for
construing the scope of the rights reserved in light of Indian
understanding was a district court decision holding that the amount of
water reserved for the Klamath reservation’s fishing purpose was that
sufficient to produce “productive habitat.”314 But that decision was
vacated on appeal as not being ripe.315
Also faithful to the concern of the Court in Winans for supplying
a judicial “counterpoise” to the inequities in treaty bargaining is the rule,
employed by many lower courts, that the measure of the rights reserved
is that necessary to fulfill tribal needs.316 A needs-based standard was
310. See, e.g., Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46–47 (9th Cir. 1981).
These are so-called Winters rights. See 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3,
§ 37.02(b).
311. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 707 (1978) (interpreting the National
Forest Organic Act).
312. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379 (1905) (“The object of the treaty was to
limit [Indian] occupancy to certain lands, and to define rights outside of them.”).
313. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 401 F.3d 979, 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (7-4
decision) (en banc), amended by 410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005). This decision was subjected to
withering criticism in William H. Rodgers, Jr., Judicial Regrets and the Case of the Cushman
Dam Decision, 35 ENVTL. L. 397 (2005). The amended decision deleted its most erroneous
reserved rights interpretations.
314. Adair, 723 F.2d at 1276–78
315. United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003). The controversy was not ripe
because the state’s quantification standard, to which the federal government and the tribe
objected, was only a preliminary decision, appealable administratively and in the state
courts. Id. at 976.
316. See, e.g., Washington v. Wash. Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658,
686 (1979) (“The central principle here must be that Indian treaty rights to a natural
resource that once was thoroughly and exclusively exploited by the Indians secures so
much as, but no more than, is necessary to provide the Indians with a livelihood—that is to
say, a moderate living.”).
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rejected four decades ago by the Supreme Court in the context of
reserved water rights supporting new uses,317 although that decision has
undergone some erosion,318 and it has not been widely applied to
reserved rights for pre-existing uses like fishing rights.319 There remains
considerable uncertainty in how to measure the scope of tribal reserved
rights to natural resources, but the concept of reserved rights has been
firmly fixed in Indian law since the Winans decision.
C. Treaty Rights as Property Rights
An overlooked legacy of the Winans decision was the Court’s
express recognition that treaty rights were property rights. Justice
McKenna referred to the treaty as creating “a right in the land,”
impressing “a servitude upon every piece of land as though described
therein,” and fixing “easements” as necessary to enable the fishing right
to be effectively exercised.320 This servitude has been described as a
piscary profit a prendre, a property right well known at common law.321
Moreover, the Winans Court made clear that these rights burdened nonparties to the treaty, as one would expect from a property right. This
burden on federal grantees, the states, and state grantees322 has been
ignored by some courts.323
The Supreme Court recognized that hunting and fishing rights
were compensable property rights nearly 40 years ago.324 Almost 30
years ago, the Ninth Circuit expressly ruled that non-Indian fishers were
317. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 600–01 (1963) (adopting a fixed measure of the
scope of the reserved right for irrigation—“practicably irrigable acreage”—because “[h]ow
many Indians there will be and what their future needs will be can only be guessed”).
318. See In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in Gila River Sys. & Source,
35 P.3d 68, 78–81 (Ariz. 2001) (adopting a multi-factor balancing test that included historic
uses, current needs, and future plans).
319. See cases cited in 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 3, § 37.02(c)(3), n.251–
57, 263–69.
320. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381, 384 (1905) (explaining the tribal rights in
property terms, apparently as an answer to the Winans brothers’ claims that the treaty gave
the tribes only a license, revocable at federal will); id. at 375–76 (relying on Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (ruling that treaty hunting and fishing rights on unoccupied
lands were abrogated when Wyoming entered the Union without a disclaimer of
jurisdiction over Indian country in its statehood act), although the Winans decision made
no express attempt to distinguish Ward v. Race Horse)).
321. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscary Profit and
Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 407
(1998).
322. Winans, 198 U.S. 381–82 (“And the right was intended to be continuing against the
United States and its grantees as well as against the state and its grantees.”).
323. See infra notes 327–328 and accompanying text.
324. Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968).
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bound by treaty rights.325 More recently, the same appellate court ruled
that private landowners could not exclude tribal shellfish harvesters
from their lands.326 All of these results confirm the Winans decision’s
insight that treaty rights are property rights.
Nevertheless, at least one court seemed unaware of the property
nature of treaty fishing rights, suggesting that the Nez Perce Tribe’s
fishing right was a mere treaty right, not a property right, and therefore
the tribe could not obtain damages from a private party.327 This failure to
comprehend the property nature of the treaty fishing rights also seems to
have influenced the Ninth Circuit’s recent holding that the Skokomish
Tribe could not collect damages against a utility whose dam operations
damaged the tribe’s fish runs.328 Both of these decisions reflected an
inadequate understanding of what the Supreme Court decided a century
ago in Winans.
D. Defeating the State’s “Equal Footing” Argument
The Court’s ruling in Winans that treaty rights were property
rights should have mooted the state’s argument about its acquiring
property rights in the tribe’s “usual and accustomed” fishing places. But
Carey, counsel for the Winans brothers, maintained that when the state
of Washington was admitted to the Union in 1889 “‘upon an equal
footing with the original States’, she became possessed, as an inseparable
incident of her dominion and sovereignty, of all the rights as to sale of
the shore lands on navigable rivers, and the regulation and control of
fishing therein, that belonged to the original States.”329 This “equal
footing” claim, which was partly an argument that the state owned these
lands, and partly a contention that it possessed exclusive regulatory
control over them, “subject only to the paramount authority of Congress
with regard to public navigation and commerce,”330 was flatly rejected
by the Court. Justice McKenna found it inconsistent with Shively v.
Bowlby, an 1894 decision that ruled that the federal government could
325. Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. United States Dist. Ct., 573 F.2d 1123, 1132–33 (9th
Cir. 1978), aff’d 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
326. United States v. Washington, 135 F.3d 618 (9th Cir. 1998).
327. Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp. 791, 811–12 (D. Idaho 1994)
(attempting to distinguish the Supreme Court’s Menominee Tribe decision). The Nez Perce
Tribe decision was criticized in Blumm & Swift, supra note 321, at 481–89.
328. Skokomish Indian Tribe v. United States, 401 F.3d 979, 980 (9th Cir. 2005), amended
410 F.3d 506 (9th Cir. 2005). See Rodgers, supra note 313.
329. Winans, 198 U.S. at 376. Although Carey did not cite it, the case establishing the
proposition that new states obtained title to lands submerged beneath navigable waters
(not shorelands) was Pollard v. Hagen, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
330. Id. at 376.
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create property interests in lands submerged below navigable waters
prior to statehood.331
Shively held that the federal authority to grant interests in
territorial submerged lands extended to fulfilling international
obligations, improving the lands for commerce, and carrying out “other
public purposes.”332 The Court in Winans thought the peaceful
extinguishment of Indian title and opening land for settlement was a
sufficient public purpose, and “surely it was within the competency of
the Nation to secure to the Indians such a remnant of the great rights
they possessed as ‘taking fish at all usual and accustomed places.’”333
Thus, the Court dismissed the state’s “equal footing” argument.
States have pursued equal footing arguments often since the
Winans decision, and occasionally they have prevailed.334 Absent a clear
expression of federal intent—as in the Yakama Treaty at issue in
Winans—title to lands submerged beneath navigable waters passes to the
state upon admission to the Union, even submerged lands in Indian
country.335 The Court has recently found sufficient federal intent to
reserve the bed of Lake Coeur d’Alene for the tribe, defeating the state of
Idaho’s equal footing claim.336 Equal footing claims are confined to lands
submerged beneath navigable waters; the Supreme Court has rejected

331. Id. at 383 (citing Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894)).
332. Id. at 383–84 (quoting Shively, 152 U.S. at 48).
333. Id. at 384.
334. Perhaps the most notable recent state victory concerned the Big Horn National
Forest in Wyoming, where the Tenth Circuit ruled that the Crow Tribe retained no offreservation hunting and fishing rights from its treaty recognizing the tribe’s “right to hunt
on occupied lands of the United States so long as game may be found thereon.” Crow Tribe
of Indians v. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982, 993 (10th Cir. 1995). The court in Repsis, refused to follow
a contrary interpretation given the same treaty by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v.
Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386 (Idaho 1972), maintaining that the case was governed by Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (a treaty hunting right was only temporary in nature, defeasible
either by statehood or by lands that ceased to be part of hunting districts), viewing that
case as “compelling, well-reasoned, and persuasive.” Id. at 994. However, the Supreme
Court subsequently limited Ward v. Race Horse to situations in which Congress did not
intend treaty rights to survive statehood. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 208 (1999) (noting that Race Horse rested on the “false premise” that
treaty usufructuary rights are irreconcilable with state regulation).
335. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 555–56 (1981) (treaties with the Crow Tribe
did not contain language strong enough to overcome the presumption against prestatehood disposition of submerged lands); cf. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620,
634–35 (1970) (upholding a pre-statehood grant to the tribe based on historical
circumstances and fee simple conveyance).
336. Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). See also Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United
States, 248 U.S. 78 (1918) (upholding a pre-statehood grant of islands and surrounding
waters for the benefit of Indians).
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state equal footing-based ownership claims to lands that are not
submerged.337
Another potential for state control over treaty rights beyond the
equal footing doctrine concerned the Winans Court’s assurance that an
“in common” treaty fishing right did not “restrain the state
unreasonably, if at all, in the regulation of the right.”338 The opaque
nature of this phrase led to generations of litigation, including several
Supreme Court cases.339 The Court first ruled that the phrase did not
allow state licensing of the treaty fishing right,340 but then affirmed that
the state could regulate treaty fishing if the regulation did not
discriminate against tribal harvests and was “reasonable and necessary”
for conservation.341 But the Court was quickly forced to strike down a
facially non-discriminatory state ban on net fishing because it was in fact
discriminatory, as it restricted only Indian harvests while allowing nonIndian hook-and-line fishing.342 Then, after upholding a harvest
allocation under which the state and a tribe divided up the harvest,343 the
Court ruled that the treaty language promising “the right of taking fish
in common with” others implied an equal sharing of harvests between
treaty and non-treaty fishers.344 Thus, the treaty fishing right, recognized
as a reserved property right to access historic fishing grounds in Winans,
has evolved into a negative right to be free of state licensing fees and
discriminatory regulation as well as an affirmative right to a half-share of
the harvest by Winans’ progeny.

337. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 596–98 (1963).
338. Winans, 198 U.S. at 384.
339. See ROYSTER & BLUMM, supra note 149, at 508–10 (summarizing the case law).
340. Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) (no state licensing because tribal members
would not have understood at treaty time that they would have to pay the state to exercise
their treaty rights and because the state could not show that the licensing was
indispensable for effective conservation of the fishery).
341. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968) (Puyallup I), which was
criticized in Ralph W. Johnson, The States Versus Indian Off-Reservation Fishing: A United
States Supreme Court Error, 47 WASH. L. REV. 207 (1972) (accurately predicting that
“conservation” was too vague a term, and that the state would soon be “conserving” fish
for non-Indian harvesters whose fees were an important source of state revenue).
342. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 414 U.S. 44 (1973) (Puyallup II) (treaty prohibits
facially non-discriminatory measures that discriminate in fact).
343. Puyallup Tribe v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165 (1977) (Puyallup III) (discounting the
fact that the tribal harvests were taking place on-reservation and suggesting that the place
of harvesting migratory fish like salmon was less important than the fair apportionment of
the “in common” fishery).
344. Washington v. Wash. Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979)
(recognizing that the tribal share was a maximum of 50 percent of the harvest, which could
be reduced if the tribe’s livelihood—or “moderate living”—needs could be satisfied with
less).
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The centennial of United States v. Winans is well worth observing.
The decision was in every respect a monumental one. It involved a longstanding controversy over a resource of enormous significance (salmon).
It concerned a site (Celilo Falls) that was of transcendent significance.345
It pitted an older civilization against an advancing civilization that was
“crowding out” the old with new technologies like fishwheels and
canneries. Finally, it produced a Supreme Court opinion that endures as
a seminal interpretation of Indian proprietary rights to natural resources.
Even if the Winans decision did not establish the reserved rights doctrine,
it would be worthy of remembrance.
But, of course, Winans did establish the reserved rights doctrine,
which remains a cornerstone of both tribal proprietary rights and
sovereign authority because under it tribes retain all rights that they
have not conveyed away.346 In the words of Justice McKenna, a treaty
“was not a grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of right[s] from
them,—a reservation of those not granted.”347 Combined with the
principle of interpreting Indian treaties as the tribes would understand,
confirmed in the Winans decision,348 reserved rights provide tribes with
important resources that they control in the twenty-first century.
Winans also made clear that the rights tribes reserved include
property rights that burden non-parties to the treaties, including private
landowners and states.349 This aspect of the Winans decision seems to
have not been understood by some recent courts.350 Finally, Winans
rejected expansive state proprietary and jurisdictional claims, which, had
they been accepted, would have left tribal members at the mercy of
hostile state officials.351 But the Court’s ambiguous language concerning

345. The Winans decision, however, could not save Celilo Falls from drowning beneath
the reservoir created by the federal dam at The Dalles in 1957. See generally DVD from
Oregon Sea Grant, Celilo Falls and the Remaking of the Columbia River (Joe Cone ed., 2005).
346. An exception to the statement in the text concerns tribal authority over nonmembers, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to be inconsistent with the tribes’
dependent status. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (prohibiting tribal
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981)
(limiting tribal civil regulatory authority over non-Indians to exceptional circumstances);
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (restricting tribal civil jurisdiction over state officials
on-reservation).
347. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905).
348. See supra notes 271, 294–296 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 277–279, 320–322 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 327–328 and accompanying text.
351. See supra notes 285–286, 329–333 and accompanying text.
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the role of state regulation sowed the seeds of litigation throughout the
remainder of the twentieth century.352
The Winans story would not have been possible without Indian
agents like Robert Milroy353 and government attorneys like William
Brinker,354 who saw the conflict at Celilo Falls as a test case, emblematic
of conflicts between historic fishing and private landowners and state
regulation throughout the Columbia Basin. The agents’ motivations
seem to have been a surprising outgrowth of allotment policies.
Although allotment aimed to improve the tribes’ economic condition by
destroying the communal nature of reservation lands and creating
private property for tribal members to become capitalists, the program
failed miserably.355 At the same time, the agents saw the preservation of
historic tribal fishing practices as central to the economic survival of
tribal members in the wake of what they viewed as the failure of the
reservation system.356 Thus, ironically, their view was that the
preservation of communal fishing practices served the same goal as the
parcelization of reservation lands—to help make tribal members part of
the economic life of the early twentieth century Pacific Northwest.357
Without that perspective, there almost certainly would have been no
case for the Supreme Court to decide.
Fortunately, there was a Winans decision, and today we celebrate
the centennial of the case for its language, its reasoning, and its result.
Above all, more than the poetic language, and even the foundation of the
reserved rights doctrine, the Winans decision reflected a judicial attitude
that was intolerant of injustice. As Justice McKenna explained, the
judicial role was to provide a “counterpoise” to the inequities of the
treaty negotiations.358 That attitude is notably absent from some recent
decisions.359 We think a better understanding of Winans and its meaning
may help prevent similar judicial mistakes. We hope this centennial
remembrance will produce better informed litigants and contribute to
better reasoned judicial decisions in the future.

352. See supra notes 287–288, 338–339 and accompanying text.
353. See supra notes 122–137, 145, 152–153, 164–167 and accompanying text.
354. See supra text accompanying and following note 211 and following note 227.
355. See generally Royster, supra note 5.
356. See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text.
357. See supra text following note 154.
358. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380–81 (1905).
359. See supra notes 327–328 and accompanying text. See generally Michael C. Blumm et
al., Judicial Termination of Treaty Water Rights: The Snake River Case, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 449
(2000).

